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Security audit

Youtube Subtitle Burner

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently helps users download YouTube videos, translate subtitles, and burn them into local MP4 files, with no evidence of hidden persistence, credential access, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.

Before installing, review the optional curl-based uv installer and local Clash proxy command, and run them only if you trust those tools and endpoints. Expect the skill to download YouTube content, install/use Pillow through uv, read the media/subtitle files you provide, and overwrite the output path you choose.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
Requirements:
    - ffmpeg/ffprobe installed (brew install ffmpeg)
    - uv installed (curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh)
    - macOS font: /System/Library/Fonts/STHeiti Medium.ttc
"""
import argparse
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The docstring recommends installing uv via a curl-pipe-to-shell command, which is a risky software supply-chain pattern because it executes remote script content directly without verification. If a user copies this command and the remote endpoint or network path is compromised, arbitrary code could execute on the host.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.