Liang Tavily Search 1.0.1

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 2:45 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search helper that sends user-directed searches to Tavily and does not show hidden persistence, unrelated data access, or destructive behavior.

Install this only if you are comfortable sending your search queries, filters, and optional raw-content requests to Tavily. Do not use it for secrets, private internal identifiers, or sensitive personal data unless your Tavily account and policies permit that use.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The skill requires environment access for an API key and performs outbound network requests, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens policy enforcement and user visibility into what the skill can access, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure or overbroad execution in agents that rely on declared scopes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill sends user search queries to Tavily, a third-party external service, and also supports returning raw/full page content, but the description does not clearly warn users about this data flow. In agent contexts, users may submit sensitive prompts or internal identifiers, so lack of disclosure can lead to unintentional transmission of confidential data to an external provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js

if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js

if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.