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Security audit

News Summarizer Official

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently generates news podcasts, with expected use of search, model, image, and text-to-speech services.

Install this only if you are comfortable with your news keywords, fetched article text, summaries, and generated scripts being sent to the configured search, model, image, and TTS providers. For sensitive topics, use local providers where possible or remove cloud API keys, and review the provider fallback behavior if strict routing matters.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to send generated news summary text to OpenAI's TTS API, which is an external network transmission of content, but it does not warn the user or require confirmation before doing so. Even if the intended content is only news summaries, summaries can include user-provided prompts, selections, or appended context, so undisclosed outbound transmission creates a real privacy and data-handling risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
3. Send as audio message

```bash
curl -s https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/speech \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The referenced OpenAI endpoint confirms that the skill's voice workflow depends on a third-party service, making data leave the local environment. While not inherently malicious, this is still a genuine security/privacy concern because the skill provides no warning, consent flow, or boundary on what text may be sent.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
3. Send as audio message

```bash
curl -s https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/speech \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The referenced OpenAI endpoint confirms that the skill's voice workflow depends on a third-party service, making data leave the local environment. While not inherently malicious, this is still a genuine security/privacy concern because the skill provides no warning, consent flow, or boundary on what text may be sent.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.