Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a straightforward Himalaya email CLI helper; it handles sensitive email operations but the behavior is visible and aligned with managing mail from the terminal.
Install only if you intend to let the agent help operate a configured email account through Himalaya. Review recipients and account selection before sending, confirm message IDs before moving or deleting mail, and prefer pass, keyring, or app-password commands instead of storing raw passwords in the config file.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
backend.encryption.type = "tls"
backend.login = "you@example.com"
backend.auth.type = "password"
backend.auth.cmd = "pass show email/imap" # or use keyring
message.send.backend.type = "smtp"
message.send.backend.host = "smtp.example.com"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
backend.encryption.type = "tls"
backend.login = "you@example.com"
backend.auth.type = "password"
backend.auth.cmd = "pass show email/imap" # or use keyring
message.send.backend.type = "smtp"
message.send.backend.host = "smtp.example.com"
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
himalaya account configure
Or create `~/.config/himalaya/config.toml` manually:
```toml
[accounts.personal]
email = "you@example.com"
The skill instructs users how to compose and send emails, including piping message bodies and headers directly to the CLI, but does not mention that message content, recipients, and account metadata will be transmitted to external mail servers. For markdown files, behaviors affecting user privacy should be clearly disclosed.
This markdown file includes a direct example for deleting an email via himalaya message delete 42, but provides no warning that the action may remove user data or be hard to reverse depending on server/account behavior. Under the markdown-specific warning criteria, destructive operations affecting user data should be accompanied by a clear caution.
The documentation includes complete working examples with backend.auth.raw and message.send.backend.auth.raw set to plaintext passwords in a user config file under the home directory. Although labeled 'testing only, not recommended', this still normalizes insecure credential storage and can lead users to persist secrets in readable files, backups, screenshots, dotfile repos, or shared systems.