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Security audit

Content Ingestion Demo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a transparent demo for turning one user-chosen file into a publishable skill package, but users should review copied content and path metadata before sharing the result.

Install only if you are comfortable with a manual converter that packages the full input file and its original path into a publishable skill. Before publishing generated output, inspect the copied reference file, remove sensitive content, sanitize local paths, and avoid ingesting untrusted documents without checking for prompt-injection text.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
scripts/content-ingest.sh:33
Finding

Untrusted reference content can hijack downstream Agent instructions

Content
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"$OUT/SKILL.md" <
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/content-ingest.sh:35
Finding

Unescaped input paths and filenames permit generated document injection

Content
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"$OUT/SKILL.md" < "$OUT/assets/metadata.json" <
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/content-ingest.sh:50
Finding

Publishable packages disclose local source paths

Content
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"$OUT/assets/metadata.json" <
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md` with name/description populated from the input filename and an auto-computed summary.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly packages user-supplied content by copying the source file into references/ and recording source_path metadata, but the user-facing description does not warn about this data propagation. This can unintentionally expose sensitive file contents or local filesystem paths when the resulting package is shared or published, especially because the workflow encourages publishing the output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.