T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:88- Finding
Unapproved Repository Modification and Remote Push
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 88–106
Vulnerability Type: Least-privilege violation through automatic repository modification and publication
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown ### 4. Handle CI Failures **自分のPRでCI失敗の場合:** 1. **失敗の原因を特定**: - テスト失敗: どのテストがなぜ失敗したか - ビルドエラー: コンパイルエラー、型エラー等 - Linter/Formatter: コーディングスタイル違反 - セキュリティスキャン: 脆弱性検出 2. **修正を実施**: - エラーログを読み、根本原因を修正 - 関連するテストケースも更新 - ローカルで同じチェックを実行して検証 3. **再プッシュ**: ```bash git add . git commit -m "fix: resolve CI failures" git pushtext ### Technical Analysis The Skill is declared as a code-review capability, but this workflow expands its authority from inspection and reporting to modifying source files, creating commits, and publishing changes to a remote repository. It does not require explicit user authorization before these write operations. The use of `git add .` is particularly unsafe because it stages every unignored change under the working tree rather than only the files deliberately modified and reviewed by the Agent. Unrelated local work, generated files, configuration data, or accidentally present sensitive material could therefore be incorporated into the commit. The subsequent `git push` transmits that commit to the configured remote and changes shared repository state. The instructions do not require verification of the active branch, destination remote, protected-branch policy, staged diff, secret-scan results, or user approval. These actions exceed the minimum privileges needed to conduct a code review. ### Attack Path 1. A code-review request is made for a PR identified as belonging to the operator or Agent. 2. The CI pipeline reports a failure. 3. Following the Skill instructions, the Agent edits source code or tests. 4. The Agent runs `git add .`, staging both its intended changes and any unrelated unignored files already present in the working tree. 5. The Agent creates a commit with ...[truncated 1156 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Make the default workflow read-only. Produce findings and a proposed patch rather than directly modifying or publishing repository content.
- Require explicit user approval before each privilege-expanding phase:
- Editing files.
- Staging changes.
- Creating a commit.
- Pushing to a remote.
- Replace broad staging with an explicit allowlist:
bash git add -- path/to/reviewed-file path/to/reviewed-test - Require staged-content review before committing:
bash git status --short git diff --cached - Run an appropriate secret scanner over staged content and stop if credentials or sensitive data are detected.
- Verify and display the destination before pushing:
bash git branch --show-current git remote -v git status --short - Never push directly to protected or default branches. Use a dedicated branch and require the user to confirm the exact remote and branch.
- Prefer presenting the final push command for the user to execute manually.
- Document rollback procedures and preserve unrelated working-tree changes.
- Clearly separate “review mode” from an optional “fix mode,” with fix mode disabled unless the user expressly requests it.
