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Security audit

AI Product Launch Monitor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill mostly does what it advertises, but it needs review because it can fetch and screenshot unvalidated URLs from feeds and then asks agents to read reports containing untrusted web content.

Install only if you are comfortable with the skill making broad outbound web requests and rendering feed-provided pages from the machine running the agent. Prefer trusted feed lists, use --no-screenshots for untrusted feeds, avoid running it in environments with access to internal services or cloud metadata, and treat all generated reports, JSON, screenshots, and links as untrusted web data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/monitor.py:262
Finding

Unrestricted Feed and Entry URLs Enable Server-Side Request Forgery

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
scripts/monitor.py:356
Finding

Attacker-Controlled Feed Content Is Exposed to the Agent as Trusted Report Text

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.environ.get (line 146, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/monitor.py (reported line 176)May include surrounding context.

python
def _brave_search(query, api_key):
    import requests
    try:
        resp = requests.get(
            "https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search",
            params={"q": query, "count": 5},
            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "X-Subscription-Token": api_key},

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises an end-to-end pipeline that performs network access, reads environment variables, and writes reports/screenshots to disk, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch can cause an agent platform to invoke the skill without clear least-privilege boundaries, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests, secret exposure through env access, or uncontrolled file creation in the workspace.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/monitor.py (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests
    try:
        resp = requests.get(
            "https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search",
            params={"q": query, "count": 5},
            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "X-Subscription-Token": api_key},
            timeout=15,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/monitor.py (reported line 197)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests
    from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
    try:
        resp = requests.post(
            "https://html.duckduckgo.com/html/",
            data={"q": query},
            headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"},

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The script silently consumes BRAVE_API_KEY from the environment to access a third-party service, but the user-facing usage text does not clearly disclose that a credential may be used or sent externally. In agent/skill contexts, undisclosed use of ambient credentials can surprise operators and create governance or data-handling risk even when the destination is legitimate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.