T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
src/validators.py:120- Finding
Role authorization fails open for actions outside declared responsibilities
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
src/validators.py:120-132
Vulnerability Type: Fail-open authorization and insufficient role-boundary enforcement
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python action_allowed = False for responsibility in role.responsibilities: if self._action_matches(action, responsibility): action_allowed = True break if not action_allowed and len(violations) == 0: recommendations.append(f"Action '{action}' not explicitly in responsibilities. Consider adding it.") allowed = len(violations) == 0 return BoundaryCheckResult( allowed=allowed, violations=violations, recommendations=recommendations )Technical Analysis
The authorization result is determined exclusively by whether an action matches an entry in the role's
must_notlist. Although the method checks whether the action matches a declared responsibility, failure to find a match only produces a recommendation. The action is still returned asallowed=True.Consequently, the responsibility list does not operate as an allowlist. Any action not anticipated by the deny list is permitted, including sensitive or cross-role actions expressed using wording that does not match a prohibited phrase. This is a fail-open design that conflicts with the Skill's stated purpose of defining and validating role boundaries.
The issue is amplified by
_action_matches()using heuristic natural-language matching. An attacker may rephrase a prohibited operation to avoid sharing the keywords needed for a match.Attack Path
- Identify a registered agent and inspect or infer its responsibilities and
must_notrestrictions. - Select an operation outside the agent's declared responsibilities.
- Phrase the operation so it does not exactly or heuristically match a
must_notentry. - Submit the action ...[truncated 839 chars]
- Identify a registered agent and inspect or infer its responsibilities and
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Use fail-closed authorization: return
allowed=Falsewhen an action does not match a declared responsibility. - Separate advisory and enforcement behavior through an explicit configuration option, with enforcement mode as the secure default.
- Replace natural-language authorization rules with structured action identifiers or enumerated capabilities.
- Treat
must_notentries as an additional denial layer rather than the sole effective access-control mechanism. - Validate role configuration at registration time and reject empty or malformed authorization lists where enforcement is required.
- Add tests confirming that unknown actions, rephrased prohibited actions, and cross-role actions are denied.
- A secure decision pattern would be:
python if violations: allowed = False elif action_allowed: allowed = True else: allowed = False violations.append( f"Action '{action}' is outside the declared responsibilities for '{agent}'" )- Use fail-closed authorization: return
