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Security audit

Pilot Video Production Pipeline Setup

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed setup helper for a multi-agent video production workflow, with expected persistence and trust setup that users should review before running.

Before installing, confirm you trust pilotctl, clawhub, and the publisher. Review each downstream pilot-* skill before allowing the install commands, especially webhook, Slack, metrics, dataset, and archive skills. Only handshake with verified agents you control, and review or delete ~/.pilot/setups/video-production-pipeline.json if the setup is no longer needed.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The README instructs operators that mutual handshakes result in trust being auto-approved with no manual review, but it does not warn about the security implications of establishing persistent cross-agent trust. In a multi-agent pipeline that moves content and metadata between hosts, this can normalize over-broad trust relationships and make it easier for a misconfigured or compromised agent to exchange data or trigger workflows without sufficient scrutiny.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to persist configuration to disk and to configure a distributor role that can send publish notifications to external platforms, but it does not require an explicit user confirmation or warn about privacy and data-sharing consequences. In this context, scripts, asset URLs, metrics, and publication events may be transmitted or stored beyond the current session, creating a meaningful risk of unintended disclosure or unauthorized external actions.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
pilotctl --json set-hostname <prefix>-<role>
```

**Step 4:** Write the setup manifest:
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.pilot/setups
cat > ~/.pilot/setups/video-production-pipeline.json << 'MANIFEST'
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The setup writes a persistent manifest into ~/.pilot/setups, which creates session-to-session state without an explicit disclosure, retention policy, or user approval step. Even though the file appears operational rather than overtly sensitive, persistent local state can expose project names, hostnames, peer mappings, and workflow metadata to later processes or users on the system.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.