T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:136- Finding
Unverified Remote Executable Installed with Elevated Privileges
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 136–139
Vulnerability Type: Unverified third-party executable fetched from a shortened URL
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash # Linux/macOS wget git.io/trans chmod +x ./trans sudo mv trans /usr/local/bin/Technical Analysis
The documented installation procedure downloads
transthrough the shortened URLgit.io/trans, marks the downloaded content as executable, and installs it globally under/usr/local/bin/. It does not pin a version, validate the resolved origin, verify a cryptographic checksum, or authenticate a release signature.Consequently, the executable installed by users may differ from the artifact that was originally reviewed. If the shortened URL, its destination, the hosting account, or the distribution infrastructure is compromised, attacker-controlled code can be substituted. The use of
sudoexpands the installation step beyond the current user's directory and places the unverified executable in a shared command-search location.This issue most directly represents an insecure dependency acquisition process. It also creates a remote-payload execution condition when the installed
transcommand is subsequently invoked, but the best matching classification is insecure dependencies.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises or gains control over the shortened URL destination, upstream hosting account, or associated delivery infrastructure.
- The attacker replaces the expected
transscript with a malicious executable or script. - A user follows the documented instructions and runs
wget git.io/trans. - The user makes the unverified file executable with
chmod +x ./trans. - The user invokes
sudo mvand places the payload at/usr/local/bin/trans. - The Skill workflow later executes commands such as:
bash echo "$MESSAGE" | trans en:es - The malicious payload executes with the privileges of the user or agent running the tra ...[truncated 763 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the shortened URL with the project's canonical, HTTPS-protected release URL.
- Pin the dependency to a specific reviewed version rather than retrieving a mutable latest artifact.
- Publish and verify a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic checksum before execution or installation.
- Prefer signed releases and validate the signature against a documented, independently obtained maintainer key.
- Avoid installing with
sudo; place the verified executable in a user-controlled directory such as$HOME/.local/bin. - Use a trusted package manager where available, with an explicitly pinned package version and authenticated repository metadata.
- Fail closed if integrity verification does not succeed. For example:
bash VERSION="PINNED_VERSION" URL="https://official.example/releases/${VERSION}/trans" EXPECTED_SHA256="PINNED_REVIEWED_SHA256" curl --fail --location --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \ --output trans "$URL" printf '%s %s\n' "$EXPECTED_SHA256" trans | sha256sum --check - install -m 0755 trans "$HOME/.local/bin/trans" - Document the expected publisher, release version, checksum, and signature-verification procedure so users can authenticate the dependency independently.
