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Security audit

swift-macos

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only Swift/macOS development skill whose sensitive API examples match its stated purpose, but users should add privacy, consent, and safer install checks when applying them.

Install this skill if you want a broad macOS development reference. When using its capture, CloudKit, process-monitoring, login-item/daemon, or test-attachment examples, add explicit opt-in, visible controls, data minimization, redaction, and easy disable/uninstall paths; verify remote install scripts before executing them.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The ScreenCaptureKit section provides implementation guidance for screen and audio capture, including app audio and microphone-related settings, without explicitly warning that these are privacy-sensitive capabilities requiring informed user consent and platform permission handling. In an agent skill, this omission can normalize building surveillance-like functionality and lead users to implement capture features without proper disclosure, consent UX, or least-privilege constraints.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The documentation tells developers to enable automatic CloudKit sync and later discusses sharing, but it does not instruct them to present a clear user-facing disclosure or obtain informed consent before transmitting app data to iCloud or to other users. In a macOS app-development skill, this omission can directly propagate privacy-harming defaults into production apps, causing unexpected off-device data transfer and accidental exposure through sharing features.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The document recommends installing Swiftly via `curl -L https://swift.org/install | bash`, which streams and executes remote code directly in the shell without any integrity verification, inspection step, or warning. Even though the domain appears legitimate, this pattern is dangerous because a compromised server, CDN, DNS path, or MITM in a weakened environment could cause arbitrary code execution on the developer machine or CI runner.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The process observation section shows how to enumerate and monitor system-wide running applications, including bundle IDs, process IDs, activation state, and background/LSUIElement apps, but does not pair that capability with any privacy warning, user-consent guidance, or data-minimization advice. In a macOS app-development skill, this is risky because it normalizes broad app-activity surveillance patterns that could be implemented without transparency to users.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The per-process CoreAudio guidance explains how to detect which other processes are using audio input/output and even discusses call detection, but it lacks a strong privacy warning that this observes microphone/audio activity of other apps. That capability can be used to infer calls, meetings, or recording behavior, making it more sensitive than ordinary system integration guidance.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The login item, agent, daemon, and LSUIElement/background app sections provide actionable persistence and background-execution patterns without emphasizing the user-trust, transparency, and abuse implications of software that auto-starts or runs without a Dock presence. In adversarial hands, these same patterns support stealthy persistence and reduced user awareness.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The examples encourage recording raw API responses and image data as test attachments, and the document explicitly notes that attachments appear in Xcode reports and can be written to disk. If those payloads contain tokens, PII, screenshots, or other sensitive diagnostics, they may persist in CI artifacts or developer machines and be exposed beyond the intended audience.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
SMAppService.loginItem(identifier: "com.example.helper")

// LaunchAgent (in Contents/Library/LaunchAgents/)
SMAppService.agent(plistName: "com.example.agent.plist")

// LaunchDaemon (in Contents/Library/LaunchDaemons/ - requires admin approval)
SMAppService.daemon(plistName: "com.example.daemon.plist")
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
plist

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
SMAppService.loginItem(identifier: "com.example.helper")

// LaunchAgent (in Contents/Library/LaunchAgents/)
SMAppService.agent(plistName: "com.example.agent.plist")

// LaunchDaemon (in Contents/Library/LaunchDaemons/ - requires admin approval)
SMAppService.daemon(plistName: "com.example.daemon.plist")
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
plist

VirusTotal

58/58 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.