Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed Swift/iOS/macOS development reference and does not show hidden execution, data theft, or deceptive behavior.
Install this as Apple development reference material, but treat commands involving App Store Connect Admin keys, notarization credentials, Xcode MCP always-allow settings, login items, Accessibility, and screen/audio capture permissions as sensitive and run them only when they match your project and account intent.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New iOS app | XcodeGen `project.yml` (generated `.xcodeproj` gitignored) + logic in a local SPM package - `ios-project-setup.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New iOS app | XcodeGen `project.yml` (generated `.xcodeproj` gitignored) + logic in a local SPM package - `ios-project-setup.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New iOS app | XcodeGen `project.yml` (generated `.xcodeproj` gitignored) + logic in a local SPM package - `ios-project-setup.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New Mac app | XcodeGen for a full app; a bare SPM executable only for CLIs and small agents (manual `.app` assembly in `spm-and-builds.md`) |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New Mac app | XcodeGen for a full app; a bare SPM executable only for CLIs and small agents (manual `.app` assembly in `spm-and-builds.md`) |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| New Mac app | XcodeGen for a full app; a bare SPM executable only for CLIs and small agents (manual `.app` assembly in `spm-and-builds.md`) |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| Ship | iOS: `ios-distribution.md` (TestFlight, App Store). Mac: `macos-distribution.md` (Developer ID + notarization, Mac App Store) |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| Ship | iOS: `ios-distribution.md` (TestFlight, App Store). Mac: `macos-distribution.md` (Developer ID + notarization, Mac App Store) |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| WindowGroup, scenePhase, NavigationStack, sheets, toolbars, Settings deep link, Liquid Glass | `ios-swiftui.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| Table, sidebar, inspector, menus and commands, forms, popovers, 27-SDK SwiftUI changes | `macos-swiftui.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| Shortcuts, drag and drop, bookmarks, AXUIElement, login items, XPC, logging, privacy strings | `macos-system-integration.md` |
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.
| `ApproachableConcurrency` | enables both `NonisolatedNonsendingByDefault` and `InferIsolatedConformances` (what `swift package init` emits on 6.4) | opt in |
| `ImmutableWeakCaptures` | explicit `[weak x]` captures are immutable, so they work in `@Sendable` closures (SE-0481) | on in Swift 7 |
A misspelled feature name is silently ignored - no warning on Swift 6.4. `swiftc -print-supported-features` is not a complete name list either: it omits `ApproachableConcurrency`, which the compiler accepts. Enabling a feature already implied by Swift 6 mode usually prints `upcoming feature 'X' already enabled as of the Swift 6 language mode` (`InferSendableFromCaptures` does); `StrictConcurrency` prints nothing.
## GCD, Combine and ObservableObject to async
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.
| [SE-0491](https://github.com/swiftlang/swift-evolution/blob/main/proposals/0491-module-selectors.md) (6.3) | module selectors: `Foundation::Date`, `MyKit::Task` | - | disambiguates clashing names |
| SE-0519, 0517, 0527, 0516 | `Ref`/`MutableRef`, `UniqueBox`, `UniqueArray`, `Iterable` for noncopyable and copy-free code | iOS 27 / macOS 27 | performance work only |
Unused throwing tasks (SE-0520): `Task { try await save() }` now warns `unstructured throwing task created by 'init(name:priority:operation:)' is not used, which may accidentally ignore errors thrown inside the task [#NoUseUnstructuredThrowingTask]` - the error was always silently dropped. Handle it inside (`Task { do { try await save() } catch { report(error) } }`), keep the task and `try await task.value`, or discard on purpose with `_ = Task { ... }`. Non-throwing tasks do not warn.
**Swift 6.4 optimizer bug ([swift#92915](https://github.com/swiftlang/swift/issues/92915), open):** in `-O` / `-Osize` builds, a method of a *generic* actor that awaits `withTaskCancellationHandler { await withCheckedContinuation { ... } } onCancel: { ... }` resumes off the actor's executor - a `preconditionIsolated()` after the await aborts with `Incorrect actor executor assumption` (reproduced with `-O`; `-Onone` passes). Debug builds are fine, so it shows up only in Release and TestFlight. Workaround: keep that state behind a `Mutex` instead of relying on actor isolation across the call.
Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.
| Channel | Export `method` | Signed with | Who can install | Review |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Development | `debugging` | Apple Development + development profile | Registered devices with Developer Mode on | No |
| Ad hoc | `release-testing` | Apple Distribution + ad hoc profile | Registered devices (UDIDs in the profile) | No |
| TestFlight internal | `app-store-connect` | Apple Distribution + App Store Connect profile | Up to 100 App Store Connect users | No |
| TestFlight external | `app-store-connect` | same | Up to 10,000 by email or public link | Beta App Review on the first build |
Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.
Prerequisites: the phone is paired, unlocked and has Developer Mode on (see ios-devices-and-signing.md).
DEVICE=$(xcrun devicectl list devices --json-output - 2>/dev/null | jq -r '[.result.devices[]
Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.
Prerequisites: the phone is paired, unlocked and has Developer Mode on (see ios-devices-and-signing.md).
DEVICE=$(xcrun devicectl list devices --json-output - 2>/dev/null | jq -r '[.result.devices[]
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Foundation
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
var description: String {
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
var description: String {
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import Security
/// Generic-password items in the data protection keychain, the same store on iOS and macOS.
nonisolated enum Keychain {
struct Failure: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let status: OSStatus
var description: String {
Detected: suspicious.destructive_delete_command