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Security audit

Gemini Image

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its image-generation purpose, but its batch workflow can create a recurring task and send images to messaging channels without enough user control.

Review this skill before installing. It is not malicious based on the inspected artifacts, but you should prefer the brew uv installation path, avoid using automatic batch-submit channel delivery unless you explicitly approve the destination and files, treat request JSONL files as trusted input, and run it with a Gemini key and filesystem access limited to the images and output directory you intend to use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Findings (5)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
README.md:58
Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Executed Through a Shell Pipeline

Content
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Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:109
Finding

Skill Instructions Request a Cross-Session Hourly Scheduled Task

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/batch.py:243
Finding

Batch Result Keys Can Escape the Selected Output Directory

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/generate.py:3
Finding

Instant Generation Uses Unpinned Runtime Dependencies

Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency metadata specifies minimum versions but no upper bounds, exact versions, lockfile, or package hashes. Running the script through `uv run` can therefore resolve and execute future releases that were not part of the audited Skill package. No evidence shows that the currently named packages are malicious. The risk is that a future compromised package release, compromised publisher account, dependency-chain compromise, or incompatible update could execute during routine Skill use. Python packages can run code during import, and both dependencies are imported before processing images or making API requests. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs `uv run scripts/generate.py`. 2. uv resolves versions satisfying `google-genai>=1.0.0` and `pillow>=10.0.0`. 3. A future compromised or otherwise unsafe compatible release is selected. 4. The package is downloaded and imported by the script. 5. Malicious package code executes with the permissions and environment of the Skill process, potentially including access to `GEMINI_API_KEY`. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could access the Gemini API key, prompts, reference images, generated files, OpenClaw configuration, network resources, and other files available to the current user. It would execute without requiring elevated privileges, but with the full authority of the account running the Skill. ]]>
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/batch.py:3
Finding

Batch Generation Uses Unpinned Runtime Dependencies

Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The batch script permits any future package versions satisfying the specified minimums. There is no lockfile, exact version pin, cryptographic package hash, or upper bound tying execution to dependencies that were reviewed with the Skill. This is particularly sensitive for the batch workflow because the imported Gemini client handles the API credential, uploads prompts and reference images, downloads result files, and accesses locally stored batch state. The Base64 operations in this script are legitimate serialization and deserialization required for inline Gemini image data; they do not themselves constitute covert exfiltration. ### Attack Path 1. A user or scheduled workflow invokes `uv run scripts/batch.py`. 2. uv resolves the latest dependency versions satisfying the broad constraints. 3. A compromised future release or transitive dependency is downloaded. 4. The script imports the package while `GEMINI_API_KEY` is present. 5. Malicious dependency code executes and can access the credential, request files, local images, batch state, and network. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could disclose the Gemini API key, prompts, reference images, uploaded batch content, downloaded results, and batch identifiers. It could also alter local files and make arbitrary network requests within the permissions of the account running the Skill. No privilege escalation beyond that account is inherent in the current code. ]]>
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (11)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description says the skill generates or edits images using the Gemini API. However, the supplied code chunk does not perform image generation, editing, style transfer, or reference-image handling. Its actual function is installing the skill locally by creating directories and copying files, plus displaying setup instructions. While installation may support the skill overall, this code chunk’s behavior is materially different from the declared purpose, so this is a mismatch for the supplied code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs automatic delivery of outputs to external channels without any warning or acknowledgment that data will leave the local environment. That is dangerous because generated images, prompts, filenames, and embedded visual content may contain confidential or personal information, and users are not prompted to review or approve the transmission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate.py (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

python
Usage:
    uv run generate.py --prompt "description" --output out.png
    uv run generate.py --prompt "combine these" -i ref1.png -i ref2.png --output out.png
    uv run generate.py --prompt "edit this" -i source.png --model gemini-2.5-flash-image --output out.png
"""

import argparse

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation describes capabilities that require environment access, filesystem writes, and network use, but the manifest does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That creates an authorization ambiguity where a host agent may grant broader-than-necessary capabilities, making misuse or unintended side effects harder to constrain or audit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest presents the skill as image generation/editing, but the markdown instructs autonomous cron-based orchestration and cross-channel delivery to messaging platforms. That materially expands the skill from content generation into task persistence and external data transmission, which changes the trust and threat model and can enable unreviewed exfiltration of generated or user-supplied images.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Automatically sending generated images to external communication channels is outside the core purpose of an image-generation skill and introduces an unnecessary outbound data path. If prompts, reference images, or outputs contain sensitive information, this behavior could disclose them to third-party platforms or unintended recipients.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase "batch submit" is broad natural-language control for launching a multi-step workflow that includes submission, scheduling, download, and delivery. Without tighter scoping or confirmation, an agent could over-trigger the workflow from ambiguous conversation context and perform actions the user did not intend, including persistent automation and outbound transfer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The workflow creates a natural-language data transmission path from local generation to external messaging channels, which is a common exfiltration pattern. Because the skill also supports user-provided reference images, this could propagate sensitive source material or derived outputs to external services without sufficient review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 247)May include surrounding context.

md
- "draft first"

**Edit iterations:**
- **Simple tweaks** (color change, font swap) → Generate directly, no approval needed
- **Structural changes** (new elements, layout changes, removing sections) → Show change summary for approval

## iOS Wireframes

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README recommends piping a remotely fetched shell script directly into sh, which executes unverified code from the network immediately. If the hosting site, transport path, or delivered script is compromised, users installing the skill could run attacker-controlled commands on their machine.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md
## Requirements

1. A Gemini API key (free) — [aistudio.google.com/apikey](https://aistudio.google.com/apikey)
2. [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) — `brew install uv` or `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh`

## Usage

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Line L368 includes a language policy statement listing preferred locales and implying a constraint toward those languages. Under the policy, locale restrictions should either offer user choice or be clearly justified as region-specific; this line does neither.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.