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Security audit

frompdf

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to be a straightforward cloud PDF-processing helper, but users should understand that PDFs, API credentials, and encrypted-PDF passwords may be sent to frompdf.dev.

Install only if you are comfortable sending selected PDFs to frompdf.dev for processing. Do not use it on confidential, regulated, or encrypted files unless you have approved that service and understand how it handles uploaded documents and supplied passwords.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Register (10 free credits, no credit card)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "you@example.com", "password": "yourpassword"}'
# → {"api_key": "frompdf_..."}
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This finding identifies the same external registration endpoint. In context, the endpoint is central to the skill's operation, but it still represents transmission of user data to an external domain and should be treated as a genuine privacy and supply-chain risk rather than ignored.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Register (10 free credits, no credit card)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "you@example.com", "password": "yourpassword"}'
# → {"api_key": "frompdf_..."}
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This finding identifies the same external registration endpoint. In context, the endpoint is central to the skill's operation, but it still represents transmission of user data to an external domain and should be treated as a genuine privacy and supply-chain risk rather than ignored.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# → {"api_key": "frompdf_..."}

# Extract a PDF (returns JSON semantic AST by default)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/extract \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY" \
  -F "file=@document.pdf"
```
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The extract endpoint uploads local PDF contents and an API key to a third-party service. Because PDFs may contain sensitive or regulated information, this is a true data-exfiltration risk if an agent uses the skill on confidential documents without explicit user consent and review of the service's privacy posture.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Extract content from a PDF (1 credit)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/extract \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY" \
  -F "file=@document.pdf" \
  -F "format=chunks"
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
This endpoint again transmits a local PDF to a remote API for processing. The skill context makes this more dangerous because its purpose is large-scale PDF extraction for LLM workflows, increasing the chance that agents may upload proprietary or private documents automatically.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-F "format=chunks"

# Encrypted PDF
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/extract \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY" \
  -F "file=@protected.pdf" \
  -F "password=secret"
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
Uploading encrypted PDFs together with the decryption password to a third-party endpoint is especially sensitive, because both the protected content and the secret needed to unlock it are transmitted externally. That defeats much of the protection provided by encryption and increases impact if the service or logs are compromised.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-F "password=secret"

# Semantic diff — compare two PDFs, get structured changes (2 credits)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/diff \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY" \
  -F "file_a=@v1.pdf" \
  -F "file_b=@v2.pdf"
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The diff endpoint uploads two local PDFs to an external service, doubling the volume of potentially sensitive content disclosed. In enterprise settings, document diffs often involve internal revisions, contracts, or confidential drafts, so the context materially increases the exposure risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-F "file_b=@v2.pdf"

# Readability score — returns 0-100 score for a PDF (1 credit)
curl -s -X POST https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/score \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY" \
  -F "file=@document.pdf"
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The scoring endpoint still requires full document upload to a remote service even though the output is only a readability score. That creates a disproportionate data-sharing risk where users may disclose entire PDFs for a low-value derived metric.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-F "file=@document.pdf"

# Check credits and subscription status (free)
curl -s https://api.frompdf.dev/v1/usage \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $FROMPDF_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The usage endpoint sends the API key to a third-party service, which is expected for account operations but still represents external credential use. The impact is lower because it does not upload document contents, though compromise or misuse of the key could affect billing and account access.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.