Back to skill

Security audit

Google Docs from Markdown

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it advertises, but users should understand it uploads chosen Markdown content to Google Drive and may download Pandoc at runtime.

Install only if you are comfortable running a local shell script that uses your existing gog Google login to upload the selected Markdown content to Google Drive. For lower risk, install Pandoc yourself from a trusted package manager or verify the downloaded Pandoc release, confirm which Google account gog is authenticated to, and avoid using it for files you do not intend to store in Google Docs.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill clearly instructs use of shell commands and an executable script, but the metadata shown does not declare corresponding permissions or capabilities. This creates a transparency and policy gap: users and review systems may not realize the skill can execute local commands, download tools, and perform uploads, increasing the chance of unexpected command execution in a sensitive environment.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The script fetches and installs an executable tarball from the internet at runtime into /tmp, then later executes that binary. This introduces a supply-chain and integrity risk because there is no checksum or signature verification, no pinned trust mechanism beyond a URL, and /tmp is a shared writable location that can increase tampering risk on multi-user systems.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill description explains the conversion workflow but does not prominently warn that document contents are uploaded to Google Drive and converted into Google Docs on Google infrastructure. Users may supply sensitive Markdown assuming a local format conversion, causing unintended disclosure of confidential data to a third-party cloud service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The script uploads the converted document to Google Drive, which necessarily transmits the file's contents to a remote third-party service. While remote upload is part of the skill's purpose, the script does not clearly disclose this data egress before execution, which can expose sensitive Markdown contents or metadata if users assume a local-only conversion step.

VirusTotal

42/42 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.