Security audit

Screencast Studio

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent local screencast tool, but its default workflow can delete unrelated files in the chosen folder and it stores login/session artifacts and private UI captures without strong handling guidance.

Install and run this only in a fresh disposable screencast folder, not inside an existing project, unless you remove or inspect the `clean` step first. Use demo or low-privilege accounts, treat `storageState.json`, screenshots, videos, summaries, and review frames as sensitive, keep them out of git and shared archives, and delete or rotate the session after recording.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The script persists authenticated browser state to storageState.json and also saves a post-login screenshot and UI structure summary to disk. Those artifacts can contain session cookies, local storage tokens, account URLs, internal navigation labels, and other sensitive application data; if reused or exfiltrated, they may enable account/session hijacking or disclose private app structure beyond the immediate recording task.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: After login, the code enumerates visible navigation links, headings, buttons, and the current URL, then writes them to post-login-summary.json. In the context of a post-authenticated session, this acts as reconnaissance against the private application surface and may capture sensitive feature names, tenant-specific labels, internal routes, or confidential workflow metadata not needed just to record a screencast.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The documentation explicitly states that `storageState.json` contains cookies, which are authentication/session artifacts, but it does not warn users that this file is sensitive, should be protected, and must not be committed, shared, or archived insecurely. In the context of a screencast automation skill that logs into real web apps, exposed storage state can enable session hijacking or unauthorized access to the target application.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: Writing context.storageState() to disk stores durable authenticated session material such as cookies and possibly local/session storage values. Without any warning, protection, or lifecycle management, this creates a reusable credential artifact that can be copied by other local users, committed to source control, or unintentionally included in logs, backups, or shared demo assets.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: templates/postprocess.js:136

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: templates/review.js:46