T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unverified Third-Party Skills May Be Installed from External Marketplaces
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 29–48
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Content
markdown ### Step 3: 在 claw.ai / ClawHub 搜索技能 - 使用公司画像里的关键词作为检索词,至少覆盖这三类角色: `业务角色`、`交付角色`、`增长角色`。 - 每类角色至少找到 1 个候选 skill,记录: `skill 名称`、`用途`、`适配原因`、`安装入口或标识`。 - 优先选择描述清晰、用途明确、和用户场景直接匹配的技能。 ### Step 4: 产出“一键安装包”建议 - 按“基础包 + 增强包”输出,默认 3-6 个 skill: `基础包`:保证最小可用团队能力。 `增强包`:提升效率或扩展场景。 - 明确每个 skill 对应的角色归属(如招聘官、销售、产品、工程、运营)。 - 标注安装顺序(先基础后增强)。 ### Step 5: 二次确认并安装 - 在执行安装前必须显式确认,使用固定问题: `以上是为你生成的一键安装包,是否现在开始安装?(回复:确认安装 / 调整方案)` - 用户回复“确认安装”后再安装;若用户要求调整,先改方案再确认。 - 安装完成后输出: `已安装`、`安装失败`、`跳过` 三类结果,并给出下一步建议。Technical Analysis
The workflow searches external skill registries and selects candidates primarily according to descriptive clarity, stated purpose, and contextual relevance. It does not require verification of publisher identity, source repository ownership, package signatures, immutable versions, content hashes, installation scripts, requested permissions, transitive dependencies, or runtime behavior.
The explicit user-confirmation step prevents silent installation, but it does not provide an effective supply-chain security boundary. The user is not required to receive or approve security-relevant provenance, permissions, code-review results, or integrity information before confirming installation. A malicious or compromised marketplace entry could therefore be presented as a legitimate role skill based solely on convincing metadata.
The project contains no executable installation implementation, so this finding concerns the documented installation workflow rather than a confirmed malicious payload in the audited package.
Attack Path
- An attacker publishes a malicious, typosquatted, or compromised skill on claw.ai or ClawHub.
- The attacker gives the skill a clear description and role keywords that match business, delivery, or growth searches.
- The workflow discovers the ...[truncated 1238 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Restrict automatic recommendations to an explicit allowlist of trusted publishers and verified skill identifiers.
- Verify publisher identity and repository ownership before presenting a skill as installable.
- Pin every recommended skill to an immutable version, commit digest, or cryptographic package hash.
- Inspect the complete skill package, including instructions, scripts, installation commands, manifests, and transitive dependencies.
- Reject skills containing obfuscated code, remote-script execution, unexpected persistence, credential access, excessive filesystem access, or unnecessary network communication.
- Apply least-privilege controls and display each skill's requested permissions before confirmation.
- Extend the confirmation screen to show the publisher, source URL, pinned version, integrity hash, permissions, audit status, and identified security warnings.
- Install and test third-party skills in an isolated sandbox without production credentials or unrestricted host access.
- Revalidate integrity immediately before installation to prevent package replacement between review and installation.
- Maintain an audit log recording the selected package, publisher, immutable version, hash, permissions, confirmation event, and installation result.
