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Security audit

TaskTime Pro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent TaskTime Pro bridge guide with clear user approval controls, though users should verify the external npm bridge package before installing.

Install only if you trust TaskTime Pro as the publisher, and prefer a pinned or verified bridge/plugin release when available. After pairing, review the granted scopes and reserve billing, export, email, restore, and deletion actions for cases where you intentionally approve them in TaskTime Pro.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding

Unpinned Executable npm Dependencies Cannot Be Independently Audited

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

md
- Never expose the bridge through public interfaces, tunnels, shared hosts, or remote control channels.
- Never mutate raw IndexedDB, Yjs documents, Google Drive sync files, invoice state, or billing state outside the TaskTime Pro bridge.
- Never ask the user to reset browser data, clear IndexedDB, or wipe Drive sync state as a normal fix.
- Never print pairing codes, approval tokens, authorization headers, exported account data, invoice PDFs, or email payloads unless the user explicitly asks for that artifact.
- Treat destructive, restore, billing, export, and email tools as high-impact operations: read or preview first, explain the intended action, then mutate only with explicit user intent and TaskTime Pro approval.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.