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Security audit

Orderly One Dex

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only guide for managing an Orderly One DEX, with expected wallet/API interactions and no hidden executable behavior.

Install only if you intend to let the agent help administer an Orderly One DEX. Confirm all wallet signatures, token transfers, receiver addresses, DEX updates, and any analyticsScript content yourself before submission, since these actions can affect funds, deployed sites, and end-user privacy.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly supports an `analyticsScript` field that is only described as Base64-encoded, with no restrictions, trust boundaries, consent requirements, or privacy warning. In the context of a white-label DEX that deploys user-facing web properties, this can enable arbitrary third-party tracking or script injection into the deployed site, exposing end-user data and increasing supply-chain risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**EVM Wallet:** 4. Register with Orderly Network API:

- `GET https://api.orderly.org/v1/registration_nonce`
- Sign EIP-712 typed data: `{ brokerId, chainId, timestamp, registrationNonce }`
- `POST https://api.orderly.org/v1/register_account` with `{ message, signature, userAddress, chainType: "EVM" }`
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**EVM Wallet:** 4. Register with Orderly Network API:

- `GET https://api.orderly.org/v1/registration_nonce`
- Sign EIP-712 typed data: `{ brokerId, chainId, timestamp, registrationNonce }`
- `POST https://api.orderly.org/v1/register_account` with `{ message, signature, userAddress, chainType: "EVM" }`
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**EVM Wallet:** 4. Register with Orderly Network API:

- `GET https://api.orderly.org/v1/registration_nonce`
- Sign EIP-712 typed data: `{ brokerId, chainId, timestamp, registrationNonce }`
- `POST https://api.orderly.org/v1/register_account` with `{ message, signature, userAddress, chainType: "EVM" }`
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**EVM Wallet:** 4. Register with Orderly Network API:

- `GET https://api.orderly.org/v1/registration_nonce`
- Sign EIP-712 typed data: `{ brokerId, chainId, timestamp, registrationNonce }`
- `POST https://api.orderly.org/v1/register_account` with `{ message, signature, userAddress, chainType: "EVM" }`
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The natural-language documentation limits `seoSiteLanguage` to `en` or `en-US` and `seoSiteLocale` to `en_US`, which effectively forces an English locale. Because the file does not explain that this is region-specific or offer an opt-in choice, it conflicts with the language/locale policy criteria.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.