HealthOS DNA analysis

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 18, 2026 · 2:43 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill openly uploads DNA files to HealthOS for analysis and includes consent, payment, credential, and deletion guidance consistent with that purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the DNA file and related questions to HealthOS. Use it only for your own DNA or DNA you have explicit permission to analyze, keep the API key and analysis token private, consider the free browser upload option, and have the agent delete the analysis when finished.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (14)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

The same analysis is free for a person in a browser at https://healthosx.com/dna — say so if the user would rather do it themselves. This API is for doing it on their behalf, at **$1 per analysis**.

Base URL: `https://api.healthosx.com/api`

## Before you touch anyone's DNA

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill is explicitly designed to send raw DNA files and derived genetic information to an external API. Genomic data is uniquely identifying, lifelong, and sensitive for both the user and biological relatives, so third-party transmission materially increases privacy and misuse risk.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 1. A key, and credits

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name": "my-agent"}'
```

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Under ~100 MB, one request:

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $DNA_KEY" -F "file=@/path/to/genome.txt"
```

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: This call uploads the user's raw genome file to a third-party API. Raw DNA is extremely sensitive, immutable, and strongly identifying; transmitting it off-platform creates substantial privacy, confidentiality, and secondary-use risk, especially because the data also implicates relatives.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Over ~100 MB (a whole genome is 300-400 MB), upload in chunks — one request per chunk, in order from 0:

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/start \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $DNA_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"bytes": 376000000, "vendor": "Nebula", "source_kind": "vcf"}'
# → {"token": "…", "chunk_bytes": 33554432}

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: Starting a chunked upload is part of transmitting an entire whole-genome file to an external service. Whole-genome VCFs can contain far more health and familial information than consumer chip exports, making the sensitivity and downstream privacy impact especially high.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

-d '{"bytes": 376000000, "vendor": "Nebula", "source_kind": "vcf"}'
# → {"token": "…", "chunk_bytes": 33554432}
split -b 33554432 genome.vcf.gz chunk_          # then, for i, file in enumerate(chunks):
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/$TOKEN/chunk/0 \
  --data-binary @chunk_aa
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/$TOKEN/finish
```

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: This chunk upload transmits portions of the raw genome to the third-party service. The chunked mechanism does not reduce sensitivity; it only changes transport format, so the privacy and exfiltration risk remains severe.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 3. Wait for the report

```bash
curl -s https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/$TOKEN
```

Poll every 3-5 seconds. `status` is `uploading`, `processing`, `ready` or `failed`. A chip file is usually ready in 2-3 minutes, a whole genome in 5-10. `progress` carries a human label meanwhile — show it rather than going silent — but it is null once the analysis is `ready` or `failed`, and a small file can be ready on the first poll with no progress ever shown. A `failed` analysis (an unreadable file) refunds its credit automatically.

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Polling the report endpoint retrieves processed genetic results from a third-party service, which means sensitive health, ancestry, and trait data is being transmitted back into the agent context. Even if expected, this broadens exposure surface and may lead to leakage via logs, prompts, transcripts, or downstream tools.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 4. Ask about the result

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/$TOKEN/chat \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"message": "What does my APOE result mean?"}'
```

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: This duplicate finding corresponds to sending follow-up health/genetics questions to the external provider, which can reveal sensitive inferences even beyond the original report. In the context of a DNA-analysis skill, such transmission is materially risky because the subject matter is exceptionally sensitive.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

## 4. Ask about the result

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.healthosx.com/api/v1/dna/analyze/$TOKEN/chat \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"message": "What does my APOE result mean?"}'
```

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: This duplicate finding corresponds to sending follow-up health/genetics questions to the external provider, which can reveal sensitive inferences even beyond the original report. In the context of a DNA-analysis skill, such transmission is materially risky because the subject matter is exceptionally sensitive.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.