T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
templates/AGENTS.md:1- Finding
Hardcoded Third-Party Identity and Command Authority Hijack the Installed Agent
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a real business-automation starter, but it installs broad autonomous behavior with hardcoded command identities, scheduled memory writes, and unsafe overwrites of sensitive workspace files.
Install only into a fresh or backed-up OpenClaw workspace. Before running setup, review templates/AGENTS.md and replace every Tara/Kalin-specific authority rule, decide whether Telegram or any other channel should control the agent, and disable or edit the cron jobs if you do not want automatic memory consolidation. Do not run the setup script over an existing workspace unless you are prepared for it to overwrite core identity, policy, heartbeat, tool, and memory files.
templates/AGENTS.md:1Hardcoded Third-Party Identity and Command Authority Hijack the Installed Agent
templates/nightly-memory-consolidation.md:6Automated Conversation Consolidation Can Persist Untrusted Content Across Sessions
scripts/setup-foundation.sh:86Setup Script Overwrites Existing Agent Policy, Identity, and Memory Without Backup
The README states that the bot sends Telegram/Discord briefings containing revenue, unfinished tasks, and priorities, but it does not clearly warn that potentially sensitive business information may be transmitted through third-party messaging platforms. This can expose confidential operational data if chat accounts are compromised, misconfigured, or insufficiently access-controlled.
The README explicitly says the bot will log work to daily memory files, extract insights into the knowledge base, and update long-term memory on a schedule, but it does not clearly warn users that this creates ongoing autonomous writes inside their workspace after installation. In an agent skill, silent persistent writes can capture sensitive business data, create unexpected retention, and make users underestimate the privacy and operational impact of enabling the skill.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
Small tasks (<15 min): Handle directly
Medium tasks (15 min - 1 hour): Create tmux session
Large tasks (>1 hour): Spawn Ralph loop
The skill's read_when conditions are broad and map to common setup activities, which can cause the skill to be surfaced or invoked in situations where the user did not specifically intend to enable business automation behavior. In this context, the risk is elevated because the skill also promotes setup scripts, workspace changes, and recurring automation, so accidental selection can lead to unexpected operational changes.
The skill describes installation and later mentions created files and cron jobs, but it does not prominently warn up front that setup will modify the user's workspace and automatically configure scheduled tasks. This is dangerous because users may initiate installation without understanding the persistence and automation being introduced, increasing the chance of unauthorized file creation, background task execution, or trust confusion around agent behavior.
The script uses multiple cat > redirections and cp operations to create or overwrite files in the target workspace without checking whether those files already exist or prompting the user before replacement. This can destroy prior notes, identity files, or operational instructions, causing integrity loss and accidental data destruction in a persistent agent workspace.
The script silently registers recurring cron jobs that will continue executing after setup, with no explicit consent step describing that persistent scheduled actions are being installed. In an agent context, this creates ongoing automated behavior that may consume resources, act on workspace data, or surprise the user long after the initial script run.
These instructions explicitly tell the agent to update memory and other files whenever it wants to remember something, learns a lesson, or makes a mistake, but they do not require user confirmation, visibility, or policy checks before persisting data. In a system that may process adversarial inputs, this creates a durable prompt-injection and data-poisoning risk: untrusted content can be written into trusted memory files and influence future sessions.
The skill grants broad autonomy to act 'without asking,' including replying on external platforms, handling support email, fixing bugs, committing and pushing changes, and updating documentation and memory. Even though later sections add some boundaries, this level of delegated authority increases the blast radius of mistakes or prompt-injection-induced actions, especially because the same document encourages proactive operation and use of multiple external channels.
## Decision Authority
### You CAN do without asking:
- Read files, explore, organize, learn, search the web
- Reply to Twitter/X mentions
- Handle routine customer support via email
This skill explicitly instructs the agent to modify multiple persistent memory files, including daily notes and MEMORY.md, without any user-facing warning, confirmation boundary, or safeguards around what may be written. In a scheduled autonomous context, this can cause silent integrity issues, accidental persistence of sensitive or low-quality information, and hard-to-audit changes to long-term memory.
The skill instructs the agent to run re-index and embedding commands automatically, but provides no warning, approval boundary, or constraints on command execution. Even if intended for maintenance, autonomous command execution can alter system state, consume resources, or trigger unsafe behavior if the environment or command mapping is broader than expected.
The package description presents the skill as a broadly capable 'autonomous business operator' with memory, automation, and workflows, but it does not define clear activation boundaries, allowed actions, or user-consent constraints. In an agent skill context, vague scope increases the chance the skill will be invoked for overly broad tasks or granted excessive trust, which can lead to unsafe automation or misuse when paired with more capable instructions elsewhere in the skill.
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
## 2. Communication
- Check for unread messages in authenticated channels that haven't been addressed
- Handle anything urgent that was missed
## 3. Proactive Monitoring
- Is anything from today's plan stalled or needs attention?