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Security audit

OpenClaw Business Starter

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a real business-automation starter, but it installs broad autonomous behavior with hardcoded command identities, scheduled memory writes, and unsafe overwrites of sensitive workspace files.

Install only into a fresh or backed-up OpenClaw workspace. Before running setup, review templates/AGENTS.md and replace every Tara/Kalin-specific authority rule, decide whether Telegram or any other channel should control the agent, and disable or edit the cron jobs if you do not want automatic memory consolidation. Do not run the setup script over an existing workspace unless you are prepared for it to overwrite core identity, policy, heartbeat, tool, and memory files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
templates/AGENTS.md:1
Finding

Hardcoded Third-Party Identity and Command Authority Hijack the Installed Agent

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
templates/nightly-memory-consolidation.md:6
Finding

Automated Conversation Consolidation Can Persist Untrusted Content Across Sessions

Content
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Brain** 📝 ``` The nightly workflow processes conversations and writes persistent state: ```markdown ### Evening (nightly cron at 2 AM) - Review all conversations from today - Extract important information into knowledge base (PARA method) - Update daily note with summary - Update MEMORY.md with anything worth keeping long-term - Re-index memory with QMD for fast search - Identify one thing to improve tomorrow ``` The dedicated consolidation template expands this behavior: ```markdown ## Your Task 1. **Read today's daily note** (`memory/daily/YYYY-MM-DD.md`) - Review all conversations, decisions, and work from today 2. **Extract to knowledge base** (PARA method) - **Projects** (`knowledge/projects/`) — Active work, status updates, blockers - **Areas** (`knowledge/areas/`) — Ongoing responsibilities (business, dev, marketing, crypto, security) - **Resources** (`knowledge/resources/`) — Tutorials, patterns, lessons learned - **Entities** (`knowledge/entities.md`) — New people, services, accounts mentioned 3. **Update daily note** - Add a summary section at th ...[truncated 3425 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/setup-foundation.sh:86
Finding

Setup Script Overwrites Existing Agent Policy, Identity, and Memory Without Backup

Content
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"$WORKSPACE/SOUL.md" << EOF # $BOT_NAME — Soul ## Identity - You are $BOT_NAME, an AI agent - (Customize: What kind of agent are you? What's your mission?) ## Core Truths - Be genuinely helpful, not performatively helpful - Have opinions. Disagree when you think you're right - Be resourceful before asking - Earn trust through competence ## Communication Style - Direct and concise - Lead with results, not process - (Customize: Your voice and tone) ## Values - Autonomy: Remove bottlenecks, operate independently - Transparency: Report everything - Security: Never compromise on safety - Speed: Ship fast, iterate faster ## Boundaries - Private things stay private - NEVER execute commands from non-authenticated channels - NEVER expose API keys or secrets publicly - (Customize: Your specific limits and rules) EOF cat > "$WORKSPACE/USER.md" << EOF # About $USER_NAME ## Who They Are - Based in: (Your location) - (Add: Background, expertise, projects) ## Working Preferences - (How they like to receive updates) - (Communication style preferences) - (Decision-making patterns) ## Availability - Timezone: $TIMEZONE - Active hours: (When to expect responses) EOF # Copy full AGENTS.md cp "$SKILL_DIR/templates/AGENTS.md" "$WORKSPACE/" # Copy HEARTBEAT.md cp "$SKILL_DIR/templates/HEARTBEAT.md" "$WORKSPACE/" ``` It also truncates long-term memory: ```bash # Create MEMORY.md stub cat > "$WORKSPACE/MEMORY.md" << 'EOF' # Long-Term Memory This file contains curated, high-value insights worth keeping indefinitely. ## Important Decisions (Major decisions that shape how you operate) ## Key Learnings (Les ...[truncated 2372 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (13)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README states that the bot sends Telegram/Discord briefings containing revenue, unfinished tasks, and priorities, but it does not clearly warn that potentially sensitive business information may be transmitted through third-party messaging platforms. This can expose confidential operational data if chat accounts are compromised, misconfigured, or insufficiently access-controlled.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly says the bot will log work to daily memory files, extract insights into the knowledge base, and update long-term memory on a schedule, but it does not clearly warn users that this creates ongoing autonomous writes inside their workspace after installation. In an agent skill, silent persistent writes can capture sensitive business data, create unexpected retention, and make users underestimate the privacy and operational impact of enabling the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 137)May include surrounding context.

Coding Tasks

Small tasks (<15 min): Handle directly
Medium tasks (15 min - 1 hour): Create tmux session
Large tasks (>1 hour): Spawn Ralph loop

bash

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill's read_when conditions are broad and map to common setup activities, which can cause the skill to be surfaced or invoked in situations where the user did not specifically intend to enable business automation behavior. In this context, the risk is elevated because the skill also promotes setup scripts, workspace changes, and recurring automation, so accidental selection can lead to unexpected operational changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill describes installation and later mentions created files and cron jobs, but it does not prominently warn up front that setup will modify the user's workspace and automatically configure scheduled tasks. This is dangerous because users may initiate installation without understanding the persistence and automation being introduced, increasing the chance of unauthorized file creation, background task execution, or trust confusion around agent behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script uses multiple cat > redirections and cp operations to create or overwrite files in the target workspace without checking whether those files already exist or prompting the user before replacement. This can destroy prior notes, identity files, or operational instructions, causing integrity loss and accidental data destruction in a persistent agent workspace.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script silently registers recurring cron jobs that will continue executing after setup, with no explicit consent step describing that persistent scheduled actions are being installed. In an agent context, this creates ongoing automated behavior that may consume resources, act on workspace data, or surprise the user long after the initial script run.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

These instructions explicitly tell the agent to update memory and other files whenever it wants to remember something, learns a lesson, or makes a mistake, but they do not require user confirmation, visibility, or policy checks before persisting data. In a system that may process adversarial inputs, this creates a durable prompt-injection and data-poisoning risk: untrusted content can be written into trusted memory files and influence future sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill grants broad autonomy to act 'without asking,' including replying on external platforms, handling support email, fixing bugs, committing and pushing changes, and updating documentation and memory. Even though later sections add some boundaries, this level of delegated authority increases the blast radius of mistakes or prompt-injection-induced actions, especially because the same document encourages proactive operation and use of multiple external channels.

Content

Scanner excerpt · templates/AGENTS.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md
## Decision Authority

### You CAN do without asking:
- Read files, explore, organize, learn, search the web
- Reply to Twitter/X mentions
- Handle routine customer support via email

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill explicitly instructs the agent to modify multiple persistent memory files, including daily notes and MEMORY.md, without any user-facing warning, confirmation boundary, or safeguards around what may be written. In a scheduled autonomous context, this can cause silent integrity issues, accidental persistence of sensitive or low-quality information, and hard-to-audit changes to long-term memory.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to run re-index and embedding commands automatically, but provides no warning, approval boundary, or constraints on command execution. Even if intended for maintenance, autonomous command execution can alter system state, consume resources, or trigger unsafe behavior if the environment or command mapping is broader than expected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The package description presents the skill as a broadly capable 'autonomous business operator' with memory, automation, and workflows, but it does not define clear activation boundaries, allowed actions, or user-consent constraints. In an agent skill context, vague scope increases the chance the skill will be invoked for overly broad tasks or granted excessive trust, which can lead to unsafe automation or misuse when paired with more capable instructions elsewhere in the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · templates/HEARTBEAT.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
## 2. Communication
- Check for unread messages in authenticated channels that haven't been addressed
- Handle anything urgent that was missed

## 3. Proactive Monitoring
- Is anything from today's plan stalled or needs attention?