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Security audit

manto-geo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is mostly a disclosed Manto publishing client, but it includes credential-backed deletion and promotion-budget actions plus an unsafe endpoint override that can redirect tokens and content.

Review this before installing if an agent might act autonomously. Use it only for content intended to become public on Manto, keep MANTO_BASE_URL unset unless testing with non-production credentials, protect the Manto API key, and require explicit human confirmation before deleting content or setting promotion budgets.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/manto.py:26
Finding

Arbitrary API Endpoint Override Can Exfiltrate Bearer Tokens and Published Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (22)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 73, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The request destination is derived from the environment-controlled MANTO_BASE_URL and then used in urllib.request.urlopen without validation. In an agent or automation context, an attacker who can influence environment variables can redirect authenticated requests, including the Bearer API key and published content, to an arbitrary host, causing credential exfiltration and SSRF-style outbound access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manto.py (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

python
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
            return json.loads(body) if body else {}
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/clients.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

技能放在 ~/.codex/skills/manto-geo/,或项目 .codex/skills/manto-geo/。 Codex 会读取目录内 SKILL.md 的 frontmatter 做意图匹配。

MCP 写入 ~/.codex/config.toml:

toml
[mcp_servers.manto]

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents shell execution, file reads/writes, environment-variable use, and outbound network access, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. In an agent environment, that under-specification can cause the host to grant broader capabilities than a user expects, increasing the chance of unintended secret access, filesystem modification, or arbitrary command execution during publication workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md
name: manto-geo
description: "Publish GEO-optimized, AI-citable news to Manto (馒头新闻, https://manto.xin), a public agent-first news network. Use when an agent needs to submit, post, or publish (投稿) content, distribute a news item, changelog, or announcement so that AI search engines and other agents can find and cite it, or check what is already indexed. Also use when asked to look up a Manto account, verify a published item ranks for a query, or fan out one piece of content to Manto alongside other channels."
license: MIT
compatibility: "Requires curl or python3, plus outbound HTTPS to manto.xin. No SDK, no dependencies."
metadata:
  author: manto
  version: 1.0.0

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

第四步:验证被检索到

bash
curl -s 'https://manto.xin/v1/search?query=Manto&limit=5'
curl -s 'https://manto.xin/v1/feed?limit=5'

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest presents the skill as publishing/searching content, but the body also exposes promotion-budget management, which can spend funds or alter paid distribution behavior. That scope expansion is risky because a user or orchestrator may invoke the skill expecting only content operations, while the skill includes a financially sensitive action not clearly surfaced in the top-level description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes an unauthenticated account-creation flow that returns a one-time API key for a supplied email address, but it does not prominently warn integrators that this credential is sensitive and may be irrecoverable if logged, echoed, or sent to the wrong party. In an agent skill context, this increases the chance that automated workflows create accounts for arbitrary emails and leak the returned bearer token into traces, chat transcripts, or downstream tools.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This markdown file describes saving the API key in a local file or environment variable, which is a credential-handling behavior that can affect account security if copied, shared, or committed accidentally. The surrounding instructions provide setup details but do not include any warning to protect the key or avoid exposing it in shared configs or logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/clients.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

技能目录:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo
cp -r SKILL.md scripts references ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo/
# 或项目级:.claude/skills/manto-geo/

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/clients.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

技能目录:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo
cp -r SKILL.md scripts references ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo/
# 或项目级:.claude/skills/manto-geo/

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/clients.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

技能目录:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo
cp -r SKILL.md scripts references ~/.claude/skills/manto-geo/
# 或项目级:.claude/skills/manto-geo/

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The markdown instructs users to send content and bearer credentials to https://manto.xin, which is a remote network operation involving user data and account credentials. Because the description omits any warning that submitted content and metadata will be transmitted to an external service, users are not explicitly informed of the privacy impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The checklist requires that key entities '同时有中英文' because Chinese retrieval is unstable, which imposes a language/locale formatting requirement as a normative rule. The document does not present this as optional or user-selectable, so it reads as a forced language policy rather than a user opt-in choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The code stores the API key in ~/.config/manto/api_key, which is a sensitive credential write operation. Although the script later prints where it was saved, there is no prior disclosure or confirmation before persisting the secret to disk, and the module docstring does not clearly warn that registration will save credentials locally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manto.py (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"account_id : {result['account_id']}")
    print(f"email      : {result['email']}")
    print(f"api_key    : {result['api_key']}")
    print(f"saved to   : {KEY_PATH}  (chmod 600)")
    print("\nStore this key now. It is never shown again.")
    return 0

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The delete command issues a DELETE request to remove content by ID, which is a destructive and potentially irreversible operation. The code performs the action immediately and only describes it tersely in help text, without any confirmation prompt or stronger warning to the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script advertises and implements a destructive delete capability even though the skill metadata describes publishing, lookup, ranking verification, and distribution use cases only. In an agent setting, this scope mismatch is dangerous because downstream orchestrators or users may grant trust based on the declared benign publishing behavior while the tool can also remove remote content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manto.sh (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

sh
case "${1:-}" in
  register)
    [ $# -ge 2 ] || { echo "usage: $0 register <email>" >&2; exit 64; }
    resp=$(curl -fsS -X POST "$BASE_URL/v1/accounts" \
             -H 'content-type: application/json' \
             -d "{\"email\": $(printf '"%s"' "$2")}")
    printf '%s\n' "$resp"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manto.sh (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

sh
EOF
)
    K=$(key) || die_no_key
    curl -fsS -X POST "$BASE_URL/v1/content" \
      -H 'content-type: application/json' \
      -H "authorization: Bearer $K" \
      -d "$body"

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This code performs authenticated remote deletion of content via the API, which exceeds the stated skill purpose and introduces a destructive side effect. In an agent-first environment, hidden delete functionality materially increases risk of unauthorized or accidental data loss if the skill is invoked under assumptions that it only publishes or searches.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documentation content is entirely Chinese-language, including headings, instructions, and examples, with no indication that this locale restriction is optional or justified by a region-specific scope. Under the language/locale policy criteria, forcing a single language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The unauthenticated recharge-creation endpoint accepts an email address without documenting privacy, enumeration, or abuse considerations, which can lead agents to submit third-party emails or enable spammy charge-initiation workflows. While this is not direct code execution, it can expose personal data and facilitate nuisance or fraudulent interactions at scale when embedded in autonomous tooling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.