T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Note
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
View full analysis
=2.28.0 ``` `SKILL.md:279-281`: ```bash # Setup pip install requests ``` `README.md:25-29`: ```bash 1. **Install dependencies**: ```bash pip install requests ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The project specifies only a minimum version of `requests` and does not provide an exact version, lock file, or package integrity hashes. The installation documentation similarly directs users to install the latest version resolved by pip from the configured package index. Consequently, installations are not reproducible: the effective dependency can change without any modification to the audited project. This creates a supply-chain exposure if a future dependency release, transitive dependency, or configured package source is compromised. No evidence was found that the current `requests` package is malicious. The risk arises from accepting future, unreviewed dependency versions and trusting the environment's default package-index configuration without integrity verification. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future dependency release, a transitive dependency, or a package index configured in the victim's pip environment. 2. A user follows the documented `pip install requests` instruction or installs from `requirements.txt`. 3. Pip resolves a version newer than the one originally reviewed because no upper or exact version constraint is present. 4. The compromised package executes installation-time or import-time code. 5. When `gdocs_driver.py` imports and uses the dependency, malicious code can run under the privileges of the invoking user. This path requires compromise or manipulation of the dependency distribution channel; the audited project does not itself retrieve or execute a se ...[truncated 691 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
``` 2. Generate and commit a lock file containing exact versions for all direct and transitive dependencies. 3. Record cryptographic hashes and require their verification during installation, for example: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Update `SKILL.md` and `README.md` so installation instructions use the locked, hash-verified dependency file instead of `pip install requests`. 5. Explicitly document the trusted package index and advise users to review pip configuration for unauthorized extra indexes or mirrors. 6. Establish a controlled dependency-update process that includes vulnerability scanning, release review, tests, and regenerated integrity hashes before accepting new versions. ]]>