T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies from external package registries and a mutable source repository
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
yaml metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📄","requires":{"bins":["mineru-open-api"]},"install":[{"id":"npm","kind":"node","package":"mineru-open-api","bins":["mineru-open-api"],"label":"Install via npm"},{"id":"uv","kind":"uv","package":"mineru-open-api","bins":["mineru-open-api"],"label":"Install via uv"},{"id":"go","kind":"go","package":"github.com/opendatalab/MinerU-Ecosystem/cli/mineru-open-api","bins":["mineru-open-api"],"label":"Install via go install","os":["darwin","linux"]}]}}Technical Analysis
The Skill offers npm, uv, and Go installation sources without specifying a reviewed version, immutable commit, checksum, or signature. Consequently, installation may resolve to mutable third-party content that was not present in the audited project.
This creates a supply-chain trust gap. If a package registry account, distribution channel, upstream repository, or future release is compromised, the dependency could introduce malicious installation hooks or runtime behavior. The audit found no evidence that the currently published dependency is malicious; the issue is the absence of controls that ensure Agents install the same reviewed artifact.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream publisher account, registry artifact, repository, or release process.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version under the referenced package name or modifies the mutable upstream source.
- An Agent installs
mineru-open-apiusing one of the unpinned installation entries. - The package manager retrieves the attacker-controlled release rather than a previously reviewed artifact.
- Malicious installation hooks or CLI runtime code execute with the privileges of the Agent user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploi ...[truncated 484 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each installation method to a specific, reviewed release.
- For Go installation, use an immutable semantic version or audited commit hash rather than an unversioned repository path.
- Use lockfiles and integrity metadata for npm and uv-compatible distributions where supported.
- Publish and verify cryptographic checksums or signatures for distributed binaries.
- Restrict dependency retrieval to approved registries and repositories.
- Add automated dependency scanning and controlled update procedures.
- Review new versions before updating pins, and test installations in a sandbox with minimal filesystem and network permissions.
