Back to skill

Security audit

PasteClaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill uploads content to a public Pasteclaw service and includes unsafe connection examples, so users should review it before installing.

Install only if you intend agents to publish selected content to Pasteclaw. Do not use it for secrets, credentials, private source code, proprietary documents, personal data, or production configuration unless you have explicitly reviewed and approved the upload. Replace the documented curl -sk examples with certificate-verifying requests, omit optional metadata unless needed, and require confirmation before uploads or deletes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:25
Finding

Disabled TLS Certificate Verification in Pasteclaw API Requests

Content
View full analysis
Hello","css":"h1{color:#111}","js":""}' ``` ``` The same insecure `curl -sk` pattern is used throughout the Skill for snippet creation, metadata submission, session grouping, updates, and deletion. ### Technical Analysis The `-k` option, also known as `--insecure`, instructs curl not to validate the remote server's TLS certificate. Although the URL uses HTTPS, disabling certificate validation prevents the client from confirming that it is communicating with the legitimate Pasteclaw server. An active network attacker can present a forged certificate and impersonate `pasteclaw.com`. Because the documented command accepts invalid certificates, the connection proceeds without an identity-verification failure. The attacker can then inspect or modify submitted content, authorization headers, API responses, and returned URLs. This behavior is unnecessary for the declared snippet-publishing functionality and exceeds acceptable security requirements. The supplied Python fallback uses normal certificate validation, demonstrating that bypassing TLS validation is not functionally required. ### Attack Path 1. An agent follows the documented `curl -sk` commands to publish, modify, or delete a snippet. 2. An attacker with control over a network path, proxy, DNS response, or compromised access point redirects or intercepts the request. 3. The attacker presents a certificate that is not valid for the legitimate Pasteclaw service. 4. Curl accepts the forged certificate because the `-k` option disabl ...[truncated 1156 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Hello","css":"h1{color:#111}","js":""}' ``` 2. Update all create, update, delete, metadata, and session-key examples consistently. 3. Fail closed when certificate verification fails rather than retrying with `--insecure`. 4. If a private certificate authority must be supported, document use of a narrowly scoped trusted CA file, such as `--cacert /path/to/trusted-ca.pem`, rather than disabling validation globally. 5. Warn users not to publish credentials, personal data, proprietary material, production configurations, or other secrets. 6. Treat session keys and edit tokens as credentials: keep them out of logs, command histories, URLs, and diagnostic output. ]]>

other

Note
Location
SKILL.md:73
Finding

Optional Agent and Tool Telemetry Is Encouraged Without Explicit User Consent

Content
View full analysis
Hello","css":"","js":""}' ``` Example — model only: ```bash curl -sk -X POST https://pasteclaw.com/api/snippets \ -H "X-Pasteclaw-Meta: model=claude-3-opus" \ --data-urlencode "html=

Hi

" \ --data-urlencode "title=Greeting" ``` When sharing from an agent, prefer setting `model` (and optionally `tool`) so requests are traceable. ``` ### Technical Analysis The metadata header is explicitly optional and is not required to create or manage snippets. Nevertheless, the Skill directs agents to prefer sending model identity and optionally tool identity for analytics and debugging. The metadata keys are freeform and include `source` and `task`, which increases the possibility that an agent may include user-specific, project-specific, or otherwise sensitive contextual information. The documentation does not require informed user consent, impose an allowlist of safe values, define retention expectations, or prohibit secrets and personal information. Sending this metadata exceeds the minimum information necessary for the declared publishing functionality. The issue is a privacy and data-minimization concern rather than evidence of credenti ...[truncated 1305 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to publish content to Pasteclaw.com and return a public preview URL, but it does not warn that user-provided content is being transmitted to a third-party service and may become accessible outside the local environment. In an agent setting, this can lead to accidental disclosure of sensitive prompts, source code, documents, or configuration data if users are not clearly informed and asked for consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill contains direct examples for POSTing content to an external domain, which is a real external transmission path and aligns with the skill's purpose. This becomes dangerous when used on user data, generated code, documents, or other potentially sensitive material because the skill does not impose safeguards such as consent, content sensitivity checks, or redaction before upload.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

HTML/CSS/JS (JSON)

bash
curl -sk -X POST https://pasteclaw.com/api/snippets \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title":"Demo","html":"<h1>Hello</h1>","css":"h1{color:#111}","js":""}'

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages attaching model and tool metadata for traceability but does not explain that these headers disclose environment information to a third party. Even if the data is not highly sensitive, it can reveal internal tooling, model usage, or workflow details that may be unnecessary and create avoidable privacy or fingerprinting exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documents deletion of snippets but does not warn that deletion is destructive and may be irreversible, which can cause accidental data loss if an agent invokes it without explicit confirmation. In agent workflows, destructive actions should be clearly flagged because automation increases the chance of unintended execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.