T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Unauthorized Inspection of Private Local Data and Agent Memory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This people-investigation skill tells agents to search private local archives and memory and compile sensitive personal dossiers, so it needs careful review before installation.
Install only if you are comfortable with a broad people-search workflow. Before use, require explicit consent and a lawful, non-harassing purpose; disable or remove instructions that search private local archives, messages, payments, call logs, and memory; avoid returning home addresses, personal contact details, children, unrelated relatives, or financial proxies unless strictly necessary and authorized.
SKILL.md:20Unauthorized Inspection of Private Local Data and Agent Memory
SKILL.md:135Excessive Aggregation and Disclosure of Personal Information
scripts/fec-lookup.sh:13Target Identifiers Disclosed to Multiple External Services Without Adequate Notice
scripts/fec-lookup.sh:16Improper URL Encoding Permits Query-Parameter Manipulation
The description claims a comprehensive people-investigation capability across numerous record types and OSINT sources. The supplied code does not implement that broad behavior; it only searches Federal Election Commission individual contribution data for a named person, optionally filtered by state. While political donation records could be one small component of background research, this code chunk's actual primary purpose is much narrower and materially different from the declared skill purpose. Therefore this is a clear description-behavior mismatch.
The trigger phrases are extremely broad, so the skill may activate for many generic requests about a person and then begin collecting sensitive data. Overbroad invocation increases the chance of unintended use, privacy-invasive behavior, and bypass of safer, narrower workflows.
The skill immediately frames the task as finding 'everything' about a target person and collecting identity anchors without an up-front privacy warning or legitimacy check. This encourages intrusive data aggregation and normalizes collecting sensitive personal data before establishing whether the request is appropriate.
The skill explicitly directs the agent to search private internal sources such as Google Takeout, call history, message archives, and memory files while presenting itself as a public-records investigator. This is dangerous because it silently pivots from OSINT to non-public personal data extraction, enabling unauthorized surveillance and exposure of highly sensitive information.
These instructions direct mining of internal personal data stores and extraction of sensitive identifiers such as phone numbers, addresses, DOB, employers, and message history. Centralizing that data creates a powerful dossier for doxxing, stalking, impersonation, social engineering, or broader privacy abuse.
The report template instructs the agent to compile a consolidated dossier containing contact details, addresses, family relationships, legal records, and financial indicators. Even if each item were sourced individually, packaging them together materially increases harm by enabling profiling, doxxing, stalking, coercion, and identity-related abuse.
The skill's privacy section claims only public information will be used, but earlier steps instruct access to non-public personal archives. That contradiction is dangerous because it misleads users and reviewers about the real data handling behavior, increasing the risk of covert privacy violations.
The skill invokes shell-style commands against local data stores but declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundary. That makes data access harder to audit and increases the chance the agent can read local files beyond what a user would reasonably expect from a people-search skill.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
Common names = common problem. Always:
1. **Never attribute info without verification** against at least one identity anchor
2. **Document "NOT this person"** findings explicitly (like known associates in a different city)
3. **When in doubt, say so** — "Possibly the same person, but unconfirmed" > wrong attribution
4. **Ask the user** if a specific detail would help disambiguate (e.g., "Do you know his middle name?")
This file is a curated playbook for doxxing-adjacent people search using public records, contact details, associates, address history, breach checks, and social profile correlation, but it provides no legal, privacy, consent, or abuse-limiting guidance. In the context of a 'personal investigator / people lookup' skill, the omission materially increases the likelihood of stalking, harassment, targeted phishing, and non-consensual profiling because the content operationalizes sensitive person-identification techniques for arbitrary targets.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
NAME="${1:?Usage: fec-lookup.sh \"First Last\" [STATE]}"
STATE="${2:-}"
BASE="https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/"
# FEC API key (demo key, rate-limited but functional)
API_KEY="DEMO_KEY"
The script takes a person's name, city, and state and constructs direct links to multiple third-party people-search and records services, disclosing user-supplied personal-identifying search terms to external sites without any consent, warning, or minimization. In a skill explicitly designed for background research on people, this creates a meaningful privacy risk because sensitive investigative targets may be exposed to commercial data brokers or external logging systems.
No suspicious patterns detected.