Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a documentation-only GitHub CLI reference with powerful but expected account-management examples and no hidden execution or exfiltration behavior found.
Install only if you want a broad GitHub CLI reference. Treat every example as a live command against your GitHub account: verify the repo, org, account, scopes, and command effects before running token, secret, variable, delete, --yes, --admin, prompt-disabled, extension, or raw API mutation examples.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
gh search code "TODO" --repo=owner/repo
gh search code "import React" --language=typescript
gh search code "api_key" --filename=".env"
gh search code panic --owner=cli --extension=go
gh search code --json path,repository,textMatches
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Set user secret (for Codespaces)
gh secret set MY_SECRET --user --body "value"
# Bulk set from .env file
gh secret set -f .env
# List
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Set user secret (for Codespaces)
gh secret set MY_SECRET --user --body "value"
# Bulk set from .env file
gh secret set -f .env
# List
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Set user secret (for Codespaces)
gh secret set MY_SECRET --user --body "value"
# Bulk set from .env file
gh secret set -f .env
# List
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Set user secret (for Codespaces)
gh secret set MY_SECRET --user --body "value"
# Bulk set from .env file
gh secret set -f .env
# List
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
gh ssh-key list
gh ssh-key add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub --title "My Laptop"
gh ssh-key delete KEY_ID
gh gpg-key list
The skill explicitly documents commands such as gh auth status --show-token and gh auth token that print active credentials, but it does not warn that these values can be exposed through terminal history, logs, screenshots, shell tracing, or downstream pipes. In a CLI-reference skill intended for automation, this materially increases the chance of accidental credential disclosure even if the commands are legitimate administrative functions.
The skill includes gh repo delete owner/repo --yes as a straightforward example without a strong destructive-action warning, despite the command permanently deleting repositories. Although scope requirements are mentioned, that does not mitigate the risk of copy-paste misuse or agent-driven execution in the wrong repository context.
Documenting gh secret set -f .env normalizes bulk ingestion of local .env material without warning that .env files often contain mixed secrets, development credentials, or unintended keys. This can cause accidental propagation of sensitive local values into GitHub secrets stores, including wrong scopes or environments.
The skill shows gh variable set -f .env in the variables section without emphasizing that variables are plaintext configuration values, not encrypted secrets. Users may mistakenly import secrets into variables, making sensitive data more broadly visible to workflows and administrators than intended.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
# Disable prompts for non-interactive use
GH_PROMPT_DISABLED=1 gh pr create --fill
# Use GH_TOKEN for CI/automation
No suspicious patterns detected.