T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent backup tool, but it asks users to install an unaudited global CLI, run persistent backup services, and handle cloud credentials in ways that need careful review.
Install only if you trust the `clawkeep` npm package and understand it will read, snapshot, restore, and potentially sync broad workspace contents. Pin and verify the CLI version where possible, use least-privilege S3/API keys, avoid putting real secrets directly on command lines, test restore into a separate directory first, and stop/remove any watch, UI, or PM2 daemon when it is no longer needed.
SKILL.md:11Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
s3/SKILL.md:20S3 and Cloud Credentials Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments
s3/SKILL.md:145Plaintext HTTP MinIO Endpoint Documented Alongside Storage Credentials
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
## Prerequisites
1. ClawKeep CLI installed (`npm install -g clawkeep`)
2. An S3-compatible bucket with access credentials
## Quick Setup
The skill instructs users to run initialization and a background watch daemon that continuously modifies the target workspace by creating backup metadata, commits, and synchronizing ignore files, but it does not prominently warn that these are persistent write operations. In a backup/versioning skill, this omission is risky because users may apply it to sensitive or already-managed repositories and unintentionally alter workspace state, history, or ignore behavior.
The dashboard command starts a local service that exposes workspace history and file contents through a browser-accessible interface, yet the skill does not clearly warn about the trust boundary or local exposure. Even with token-based auth, users should be told that a listening service is being launched and that binding, port exposure, and token handling affect confidentiality.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
| Target | Skill | Description |
|---|---|---|
| **Local path** | [skills/local/SKILL.md](local/SKILL.md) | NAS, USB drive, external disk, network share |
| **S3 / R2** | [skills/s3/SKILL.md](s3/SKILL.md) | Cloudflare R2, AWS S3, Backblaze B2, MinIO, Wasabi |
| **ClawKeep Cloud** | [skills/clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md](clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md) | Managed zero-knowledge backup with browser-based setup |
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
| Target | Skill | Description |
|---|---|---|
| **Local path** | [skills/local/SKILL.md](local/SKILL.md) | NAS, USB drive, external disk, network share |
| **S3 / R2** | [skills/s3/SKILL.md](s3/SKILL.md) | Cloudflare R2, AWS S3, Backblaze B2, MinIO, Wasabi |
| **ClawKeep Cloud** | [skills/clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md](clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md) | Managed zero-knowledge backup with browser-based setup |
All targets use AES-256-GCM encryption. Your backup destination only sees opaque `.enc` chunk files — no file names, no metadata, no structure.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
|---|---|---|
| **Local path** | [skills/local/SKILL.md](local/SKILL.md) | NAS, USB drive, external disk, network share |
| **S3 / R2** | [skills/s3/SKILL.md](s3/SKILL.md) | Cloudflare R2, AWS S3, Backblaze B2, MinIO, Wasabi |
| **ClawKeep Cloud** | [skills/clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md](clawkeep-cloud/SKILL.md) | Managed zero-knowledge backup with browser-based setup |
All targets use AES-256-GCM encryption. Your backup destination only sees opaque `.enc` chunk files — no file names, no metadata, no structure.
The restore workflow is documented without a clear warning that restoring backups or snapshots can overwrite existing local workspace contents. In an agent or automation context, users may run these commands non-interactively and unintentionally replace current data, causing data loss or rollback to stale state.
No suspicious patterns detected.