T08 · Insecure Dependencies
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SKILL.md:35- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
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This is a straightforward Doubao/Volcengine media-generation skill with some disclosure and robustness gaps, but no evidence of hidden, destructive, or unrelated behavior.
Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts, image URLs, and generated-media requests to Volcengine ARK using your ARK_API_KEY. Avoid secrets or private image links in prompts, review generated files in `~/.openclaw/workspace/output/`, and prefer a pinned dependency setup over the documented unpinned `pip install requests`.
SKILL.md:35Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
scripts/doubao_media.py:155Unbounded and Insufficiently Validated Remote Media Downloads
scripts/doubao_media.py:119Unbounded Video Status Polling and Improper Error Termination
The documented behavior does not accurately match the skill's effective capabilities and side effects, including image-to-video support, local file download/storage, and questionable claims about automatically sending media to chat. Behavior mismatches are dangerous because they prevent informed consent and can lead users to expose prompts, URLs, or generated files under false assumptions about what the skill actually does.
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
sage tool"""
try:
# Use OpenClaw message tool via subprocess
# The file will be sent automatically by the calling context
print(f"[Auto-Send] {media_type.capitalize()} ready to send: {file_path}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[Auto-Send] Warning: Could not auto-send: {e}")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Doubao Media Generator - Auto-send to Chat"
)
subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", help="Commands")
# Image generation
img_parser = subparsers.add_parser("img", help="Generate image / 文生图")
img_parser.add_argument("prompt", help="Text prompt / 文本描述")
img_parser.add_argument("--size", default="1024x1024", help="Image size / 图片尺寸")
# Video generation
vid_parser = subparsers.add_parser("vid", help="Generate video / 文生视频")
vid_parser.add_argument("prompt", help="Text prompt / 文本描述")
The skill advertises capabilities that require environment access, network access, and shell execution, but it does not declare any tool scope or permissions. This creates a transparency and containment problem: a user or platform may approve a seemingly simple media skill without realizing it can read environment variables, call external services, and write files locally.
The description does not clearly warn that user prompts and image URLs are transmitted to Volcengine ARK, an external cloud service, and that generated media may be posted back into the conversation. Without a prominent disclosure, users may submit sensitive text or private image links believing processing is local or outputs remain private.
Auto-send is presented as a convenience feature, but there is no explicit warning that generated images or videos will be inserted into the conversation automatically. This can cause accidental disclosure of sensitive or embarrassing generated content, especially in shared chats or when users expect a review step before publication.
The manifest description limits the skill to text-to-image and text-to-video with auto-send to chat. However, the file docstring explicitly lists 'Image-to-Video' and the video generation code accepts an input image URL to drive generation, adding a capability not described in the manifest.
The image-generation request sends user-supplied prompts to an external API over the network. In this skill context, external transmission is expected functionality, but it still creates a privacy and data-governance risk if users are not adequately informed that their content leaves the local environment.
"size": size
}
response = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/images/generations",
headers=self.headers,
json=payload,
User prompts and optional image URLs are transmitted to an external third-party media-generation service, but the tool does not provide an explicit disclosure or consent step about network data sharing. In an agent-skill context, users may assume local processing and inadvertently send sensitive text, internal URLs, or proprietary image references off-platform.
The video-generation request transmits prompts and possibly an image URL/reference to an external service. Because this skill is intended for media generation, the network call is contextual and expected, but it remains a real privacy risk if sensitive prompts or image-linked resources are disclosed without clear notice.
"watermark": False
}
response = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/contents/generations/tasks",
headers=self.headers,
json=payload,
Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.
def _get_video_status(self, task_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Get video generation status"""
response = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/contents/generations/tasks/{task_id}",
headers=self.headers,
timeout=30
Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.
local_path = self.output_dir / filename
response = requests.get(url, timeout=120)
with open(local_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(response.content)
return local_path
The module description, method docstrings, and comments repeatedly claim generated media is 'auto-sent to chat' and that OpenClaw's message tool is used. In reality, _send_to_chat only prints a readiness message and performs no chat-send action or subprocess invocation, so the documented behavior materially overstates what the code does.
User-facing text throughout the file is presented bilingually with Chinese included by default, rather than offering an explicit language or locale preference. This may conflict with a language/locale policy if user-facing language should be selectable or opt-in.
Generated media is persisted under a predictable local directory in the user's home workspace without a clear warning. In shared or synced environments, this can leave sensitive or embarrassing generated content behind longer than the user expects.