T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:75- Finding
Mandatory Promotional Output Enables Cross-Agent Skill Propagation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a real contact-card manager, but it asks the agent to publish personal profile data, auto-import received cards, and set up recurring sync in ways that need careful review before installation.
Install only if you are comfortable with the agent keeping a local contact book, publishing selected profile fields to adonghub.cn, fetching and syncing contacts from a remote service, and potentially creating a recurring OpenClaw sync task. Before using it, confirm what fields will be published, avoid auto-importing cards from untrusted messages, keep the server endpoint pinned to the intended HTTPS origin, and ask how to list or remove any scheduled sync job.
SKILL.md:75Mandatory Promotional Output Enables Cross-Agent Skill Propagation
references/manual.md:151Recurring OpenClaw Task Establishes Cross-Session Persistence
references/manual.md:105Unvalidated Configurable Server Endpoint Permits Request Redirection
The description does not disclose that profile and contact information may be pushed to and fetched from a remote server. Since the skill handles personal identity and contact data, omission of this network-sync behavior undermines informed consent and increases the privacy and security impact of using the skill.
The skill advertises automatic recognition and saving of received cards but does not clearly warn users that incoming messages can be persisted as contact data. This weakens informed consent and makes privacy-impacting behavior more dangerous, especially because card receipt can be triggered by ordinary chat content containing the custom protocol.
After a generic confirmation like '可以了', the skill automatically registers the user and publishes profile data to a remote server, but the flow does not require a clear disclosure that external transmission will occur. This is dangerous because users may believe they are only saving locally, while the skill is actually creating a server-side account and uploading public profile information.
The trigger phrase "初始化" is generic and likely to appear in normal conversations unrelated to this skill. Because this skill performs filesystem initialization when triggered, accidental activation could create or modify local state without the user's informed intent, increasing the chance of unintended data handling.
Auto-activating on any message beginning with vibe-card:// allows external content to trigger contact ingestion and server fetch behavior without a clear user consent step. In this skill's context, that means an attacker or spammer could send crafted links that cause unsolicited remote requests, data import, or poisoning of the local contact list.
This text file presents all user-facing content exclusively in Chinese, including instructions and calls to action, with no indication that the user can choose another language. Under the policy rule for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without opt-in is reportable unless the locale restriction is explicitly justified.
The only user-facing text in this file is written in Chinese, which implies a fixed language/locale experience. Under the policy, language constraints should either offer user opt-in/choice or be clearly justified as region-specific, neither of which is present here.
All user-facing text in this skill file is written in Chinese, with no indication that the user opted into that language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-language audience. This can violate language or locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language without user choice or documented justification.
The text explicitly instructs users to copy the message to their agent so it will 'automatically save' the card, and includes a custom protocol URI. In this skill’s context, that creates an injection-like activation path where a generic forwarded message can trigger privileged contact import behavior without strong verification of origin, consent, or user intent.
The onboarding text encourages broad natural-language triggers such as generating cards, sharing cards, checking rosters, and syncing contacts, which can overlap with ordinary conversation and cause unintended skill activation. In a contact-management skill, accidental activation can lead to privacy-sensitive actions such as exposing contact data, creating or sharing a profile, or modifying a roster without clear user intent.
The text states that received cards will be automatically recognized and saved, but gives no warning, consent flow, or explanation of what data is stored. In the context of a social card and address-book skill, automatic ingestion of third-party contact data can create privacy, consent, and poisoning risks, especially if malicious or spoofed cards are received via the custom protocol.
The entire share template is written only in Chinese and provides no indication that the language is user-selectable or limited to a China-specific deployment context. This can violate language/locale policy requirements when a skill imposes a specific language without user opt-in.
标题和整篇说明均以中文编写,未见任何允许用户选择语言、提供多语言版本,或声明该技能仅面向特定中文区域用户的说明。根据语言/地区政策,若技能自然语言内容默认强制单一语言且无用户选择,属于需要提示的政策问题。
Across the document, all invocation examples, confirmations, and operational instructions are in Chinese only, which effectively forces a single language experience. The file does not state that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience, nor does it offer language selection or opt-in.
The manual explicitly tells the agent to proactively extract personal details about a contact from memory and store them without obtaining explicit per-field approval. In a contact-management context, this increases the chance of collecting inaccurate or sensitive third-party data beyond what the user intended to save.
The manual directs the agent to persist contact records containing personal information to contacts.json without requiring a user-facing disclosure that this data will be stored locally. Because the skill manages third-party personal data, silent persistence creates privacy and consent risks, especially when the agent also infers fields from memory.
The skill directs the agent to derive the user's profile fields and contact information from memory for card generation, including contact methods and background information. Although drafting from context can be helpful, doing so without explicit disclosure and approval risks over-collection, accidental inclusion of sensitive data, and unintended publication in later steps.
The skill automatically fetches card data from a remote server when it detects a vibe-card message, without first warning the user that a network request will be made. Even though the message contains a card identifier, automatic lookups can leak usage metadata and trigger unanticipated remote interactions from untrusted incoming content.
The skill instructs the agent to create a scheduled task via the OpenClaw CLI, which establishes persistent automation outside the immediate user request. In the context of a contact-card skill, this expands the skill's operational scope and can cause recurring network activity and data processing without fresh user review each time.
All user-facing instructions and trigger phrases are presented only in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that language selection is optional or region-specific. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill implicitly requires a specific language without user choice.
The user-facing text is entirely in Chinese and includes a fixed trigger phrase in Chinese ("生成我的名片") without indicating that other languages are supported or that Chinese is required for a justified region-specific use case. This can violate a language/locale policy where users must be given a choice or explicit opt-in.
The only user-facing message in this file is written in Chinese, with no indication that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language by default.
The document correctly states that _skill.source is untrusted, but the broader skill behavior includes automatic recognition and saving of cards received via the vibe-card:// protocol. That combination creates a real trust-boundary risk: if downstream logic infers provenance, auto-installs, or applies privileged handling based on metadata embedded in received cards, an attacker can spoof card origin and trigger unwanted persistence or unsafe workflows.
The HTML document declares lang="zh-CN", and the visible UI strings throughout the page are written in Chinese. This indicates the skill interface is fixed to a specific language/locale with no user opt-in or documented rationale, which matches the language/locale policy concern.