Mandate

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 1:30 AM UTC
• Version: 1.3.0

Overview

This wallet-safety skill is mostly coherent, but it asks agents to trust mutable remote instructions and unpinned financial tooling, which should be reviewed before installation.

Install only after reviewing the plugin and CLI packages, pinning exact versions where possible, disabling or ignoring the remote SKILL.md heartbeat, and avoiding the optional Authorization header for update checks. Treat the Mandate runtime key like a financial-policy credential: keep it out of logs, screenshots, broad shell environments, and .env files that might be committed.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:544

Finding

Automatic Retrieval and Adoption of Remotely Mutable Skill Instructions

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:544-553
Vulnerability Type: Remote instruction replacement
Risk Level: Critical

Vulnerable code:

bash

## Heartbeat

Fetch this file at least once every 24 hours to stay current:

curl -s https://app.mandate.md/skill.md \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY" \
  -o /path/to/cached/SKILL.md

Check the `X-Skill-Version` response header against your cached version.
If it changed, re-read the file for updated instructions.

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs the agent to periodically download a new version of its governing instructions from a mutable remote endpoint, overwrite a cached Skill file, and re-read the replacement. The downloaded content is not constrained by a pinned cryptographic digest, verified signature, reviewed release artifact, or explicit user approval.

Because a Skill file controls agent behavior, adopting mutable remote content creates an instruction-injection channel. The endpoint operator, a compromised server, or an attacker who compromises the distribution pipeline could add directives unrelated to transaction validation. Those directives would be introduced after the installed Skill had passed review.

Periodic remote replacement is not required for the declared transaction-policy validation functionality. Updates can instead be distributed as versioned, reviewed, and integrity-verified releases.

Attack Path

1. The agent follows the heartbeat instruction and periodically requests https://app.mandate.md/skill.md.
2. The remote service or its deployment pipeline is compromised, or the service intentionally returns a malicious revision.
3. The returned file overwrites the locally cached Skill instructions.
4. The agent detects a changed version and re-reads the downloaded instructions.
5. Attacker-controlled directives become part of the agent's operating instructions.
6. The directives can i ...[truncated 777 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove instructions that automatically download, overwrite, and re-read the Skill file.
2. Publish updates as immutable, versioned release artifacts.
3. Pin each approved release to a cryptographic digest and verify it before installation.
4. Digitally sign releases and validate signatures against a separately distributed, pinned public key.
5. Require explicit user or administrator approval before activating updated instructions.
6. Download candidate updates to a separate file rather than overwriting the active Skill.
7. Present a human-reviewable diff before installation.
8. Reject unsigned, incorrectly signed, downgraded, or unexpected versions.
9. If update checks are retained, restrict them to retrieving non-executable version metadata; do not automatically treat downloaded text as agent instructions.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:14

Finding

Execution of Unpinned Third-Party CLI and Plugin Packages

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:14-17, SKILL.md:185-215, and SKILL.md:379
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency installation and execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable code:

markdown

**OpenClaw (recommended):** `openclaw plugins install @mandate.md/mandate-openclaw-plugin`
Hooks auto-intercept Locus, Bankr, Sponge, and any swap/transfer/send tool call.

**Claude Code (recommended):** `claude plugin:install claude-mandate-plugin` or see [claude-mandate-plugin on GitHub](https://github.com/SwiftAdviser/claude-mandate-plugin)

bash

bun add -g @mandate.md/cli
# or discover commands without install:
npx @mandate.md/cli --llms

bash

npx @mandate.md/cli scan          # Scan current directory
npx @mandate.md/cli scan ./src    # Scan specific folder

bash

npx @mandate.md/cli --mcp

text

openclaw plugins install @mandate.md/mandate-openclaw-plugin

Technical Analysis

The documented installation and execution commands do not pin exact dependency versions or integrity hashes. Commands such as npx @mandate.md/cli can retrieve and execute the package version selected by the package registry at invocation time. The global bun add -g command also installs mutable registry content into a shared environment.

The affected components have elevated trust within the workflow:

• The scanner is instructed to inspect project directories.
• MCP mode exposes package functionality to an agent host.
• The OpenClaw plugin intercepts wallet and financial tool calls.
• Globally installed CLI code runs with the invoking user's permissions.

No evidence in the audited file demonstrates that these packages are currently malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe, unpinned execution model, which permits a compromised or malicious future package release to run without another review of this Skill.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the ...[truncated 1194 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin every CLI and plugin to a reviewed exact version, for example @mandate.md/cli@1.3.0, rather than relying on registry-selected versions.
2. Use lockfiles and package-manager integrity metadata.
3. Verify package provenance and cryptographic integrity before execution.
4. Avoid global installation; install into an isolated, least-privileged project environment.
5. Replace ad hoc npx execution with a reviewed local dependency invoked through the project's lockfile.
6. Disable or carefully review package lifecycle scripts.
7. Run scanners with read-only access to only the requested source directory.
8. Restrict plugin and MCP permissions so they cannot access unrelated files, credentials, or network destinations.
9. Independently audit plugin releases that intercept financial tools, and require signed updates.
10. Document the exact package source, publisher identity, expected digest, and supported version.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:544

Finding

Unnecessary Transmission of Runtime Credential During Activity Heartbeat

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:544-556
Vulnerability Type: Credential-linked telemetry and excessive credential exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable code:

bash

Fetch this file at least once every 24 hours to stay current:

curl -s https://app.mandate.md/skill.md \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY" \
  -o /path/to/cached/SKILL.md

text

The Authorization header is optional. Passing it lets Mandate track
which agents are active. Without it, the fetch is anonymous.

Technical Analysis

The heartbeat transmits the reusable Mandate runtime key in an HTTP authorization header even though the documentation explicitly states that authentication is optional. Its stated purpose is to let Mandate track agent activity, not to authorize access to protected update content.

Using a financial-policy credential for optional telemetry violates least-privilege and credential-purpose separation principles. It exposes the token during an additional recurring network operation and causes update requests to become linkable to a specific agent identity.

HTTPS protects the credential in transit against ordinary passive interception, but the token remains available to the destination service, request-processing infrastructure, and any systems that improperly record authorization headers. A server-side compromise could therefore expose both activity metadata and reusable credentials.

The credential storage instructions elsewhere in the file—using ~/.mandate/credentials.json with mode 600—are appropriate for local storage. The concern is specifically the unnecessary credential transmission in the optional heartbeat.

Attack Path

1. The agent performs the recommended heartbeat with MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY in the authorization header.
2. The destination service correlates the credential with request timestamps and agent activity.
3. A compromised endpoint, reverse p ...[truncated 954 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove the Authorization header from heartbeat and update requests because the endpoint supports anonymous access.
2. Make all activity telemetry explicitly opt-in and disclose its fields, purpose, retention period, and recipients.
3. Do not reuse a transaction-policy runtime credential for telemetry.
4. If authenticated update checks become necessary, issue a separate read-only token restricted to version metadata.
5. Redact authorization headers from application, proxy, CDN, and observability logs.
6. Minimize token lifetime and support immediate revocation and rotation.
7. Restrict runtime keys to the smallest required API permissions.
8. Provide an anonymous, integrity-verified update mechanism that does not identify individual agents.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (18)

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

Tools: search, execute, x402_info

Key prefixes: mndt_live_... (mainnet) / mndt_test_... (testnet) Credentials: ~/.mandate/credentials.json Errors: HTTP status + JSON { "error": "message" } or { "allowed": false, "blockReason": "..." }

text

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 194)May include surrounding context.

Tools: search, execute, x402_info

Key prefixes: mndt_live_... (mainnet) / mndt_test_... (testnet) Credentials: ~/.mandate/credentials.json Errors: HTTP status + JSON { "error": "message" } or { "allowed": false, "blockReason": "..." }

text

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 222)May include surrounding context.

Tools: search, execute, x402_info

Key prefixes: mndt_live_... (mainnet) / mndt_test_... (testnet) Credentials: ~/.mandate/credentials.json Errors: HTTP status + JSON { "error": "message" } or { "allowed": false, "blockReason": "..." }

text

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 538)May include surrounding context.

Tools: search, execute, x402_info

Key prefixes: mndt_live_... (mainnet) / mndt_test_... (testnet) Credentials: ~/.mandate/credentials.json Errors: HTTP status + JSON { "error": "message" } or { "allowed": false, "blockReason": "..." }

text

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The example exports the runtime key from credentials.json into an environment variable, which broadens exposure because environment variables are often inherited by subprocesses, surfaced in diagnostics, or captured by tooling. In an agent ecosystem with plugins, MCP servers, and shell commands, this increases the chance of accidental credential leakage.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 235)May include surrounding context.

Optional environment export:

bash

export MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY="$(jq -r .runtimeKey ~/.mandate/credentials.json)"

CRITICAL: AI Agents Must Use register, NOT Dashboard Login

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

Advising users to save a runtime key to .env encourages storage in a format that is frequently committed accidentally, read by unrelated tooling, or exposed during debugging. For a key controlling policy validation in financial workflows, accidental leakage could let an attacker impersonate the agent or tamper with validation usage.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 349)May include surrounding context.

walletAddress: 'YourWalletAddress', // EVM 0x..., Solana base58, or TON chainId: 84532, // or "solana", "ton" }); // Save runtimeKey to .env as MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY // Display claimUrl to the user: "To link this agent to your dashboard, open: [claimUrl]"

text

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 442)May include surrounding context.

md

4. Retry up to 3 times at 30-second intervals
5. If all retries fail, tell the user: "Cannot execute until policy server recovers. No funds were spent."

This is non-negotiable. An unreachable policy server does not mean "no policies apply", it means "policies cannot be verified." Executing without verification bypasses the owner's configured protections.

## x402 Payment Flow

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The description includes broad triggers like auditing and prompt-injection detection across multiple frameworks, which could cause the skill to be invoked outside its narrow wallet-policy role. Overbroad invocation increases the chance that a high-privilege financial skill is unnecessarily loaded into unrelated contexts, expanding attack surface and accidental disclosure risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

REST

bash

curl -X POST https://app.mandate.md/api/validate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MANDATE_RUNTIME_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"action":"swap","reason":"Swap 0.1 ETH for USDC","amount":"50","to":"0xAlice"}'

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to execute npx @mandate.md/cli without a pinned version, which allows whatever package version is current at execution time to run. In a security-sensitive wallet-enforcement skill, this creates a supply-chain risk where a compromised or breaking upstream release could alter enforcement behavior or execute malicious code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 194)May include surrounding context.

bash

mandate login --name "MyAgent" --address YOUR_WALLET_ADDRESS

Stores credentials in ~/.mandate/credentials.json (chmod 600). Display the claimUrl to the user, they are the owner.

Agent Discovery

Run mandate --llms for a machine-readable command manifest. Each command includes --help and --schema for full argument details.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

This invocation uses npx @mandate.md/cli without version pinning, causing remote code to be fetched and executed dynamically. Because the skill governs financial transaction validation, unpinned execution materially increases the risk of supply-chain compromise or unexpected behavior changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The second code-scanning example also fetches and runs the latest CLI package implicitly. In the context of a wallet security tool, relying on an unpinned remote package undermines trust in the enforcement mechanism and exposes users to package compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

Running the MCP server via an unpinned npx command is particularly sensitive because MCP servers often receive broad tool and context access. A malicious or altered package version could exfiltrate data, weaken enforcement, or manipulate downstream agent behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 429)May include surrounding context.

md

## Default Policy

After registration: $100/tx limit, $1,000/day limit, no address restrictions, no approval required. Adjust via dashboard at `https://app.mandate.md`.

## Fail-Safe Behavior

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 442)May include surrounding context.

md

4. Retry up to 3 times at 30-second intervals
5. If all retries fail, tell the user: "Cannot execute until policy server recovers. No funds were spent."

This is non-negotiable. An unreachable policy server does not mean "no policies apply", it means "policies cannot be verified." Executing without verification bypasses the owner's configured protections.

## x402 Payment Flow

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 538)May include surrounding context.

md

## Security

- Never share your runtime key in logs, posts, or screenshots.
- Store keys in `~/.mandate/credentials.json` and restrict permissions (`chmod 600`).
- Rotate the key (re-register) if exposure is suspected.
- Circuit breaker auto-trips if on-chain tx doesn't match validated intent.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 87% confidence

Finding

The heartbeat section instructs agents to periodically fetch and re-read remote SKILL.md content, effectively granting the vendor an ongoing remote instruction update channel. Because skill files are executable guidance for agent behavior, this creates a prompt/configuration injection path that can change security-relevant behavior after initial review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.