T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/openclaw-config.md:161- Finding
Global Session Visibility Enables Cross-Tenant Data Access
- Content
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"] } } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The configuration grants client agents access to `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, and `sessions_send` while setting global and sandbox session visibility to `all`. It also adds each client agent to a flat, non-directional inter-agent allowlist. These permissions violate least privilege and contradict the stated requirement for strict isolation between clients. A client agent does not need global session enumeration or history access merely to escalate a support request. Prompt injection or compromise of one client agent could consequently expose sessions belonging to supervisors or other clients. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker sends crafted instructions through the client’s WhatsApp channel or content processed by the agent. 2. The client agent invokes `sessions_list` under global visibility. 3. The attacker identifies sessions belonging to another client or a privileged supervisor. 4. The agent calls `sessions_history` to retrieve content from the selected session. 5. The retrieved information is returned to the attacker or transmitted externally using the messaging tool. 6. Alternatively, the attacker abuses `sessions_send` to inject messages into privileged agent sessions. ### Impact Assessment A compromised client agent may obtain access to cross-client conversation histories ...[truncated 234 chars]- Remediation
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