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Security audit

HeyReach Integration

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a real HeyReach/Superagnt API connector, but it exposes organization-admin actions such as creating API keys and inviting users, so it needs review before installation.

Install only if you want an agent to operate a broad HeyReach connection through Superagnt. Prefer a least-privileged key, avoid organization-scoped credentials unless administration is intended, and require explicit confirmation before sending messages, deleting records, creating webhooks, creating API keys, or inviting users.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill includes workspace API-key creation endpoints even though its purpose is outreach operations. API-key minting enables privilege persistence and expansion, allowing an agent or attacker who can invoke the skill to create new long-lived credentials that outlast the original session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

User invitation and role-management endpoints are unrelated to normal outreach execution and can change organizational access boundaries. If misused, they allow unauthorized invitations, privilege changes, and lateral expansion of access within the HeyReach organization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises LinkedIn outreach management, but it also exposes organization and workspace administration functions. That broader authority violates least-privilege expectations and can let an agent perform administrative actions unrelated to the user’s outreach task if the connected key is organization-scoped.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

Verify the install (do this first)

bash
curl -s https://api.superagnt.com/v1/credits \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer $SUPERAGNT_API_KEY'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Verify the install (do this first)

bash
curl -s https://api.superagnt.com/v1/credits \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer $SUPERAGNT_API_KEY'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 2321)May include surrounding context.

Verify the install (do this first)

bash
curl -s https://api.superagnt.com/v1/credits \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer $SUPERAGNT_API_KEY'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.