Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This landing-page generator has a coherent purpose, but its script can write outside the intended folder and can generate unsafe deployable pages when given untrusted product text.
Review this skill before installing or using it in automated workflows. Use only trusted product names and descriptions, choose an output directory deliberately, avoid running it in sensitive project roots, and inspect generated files before opening or deploying them. Harden the script by slugifying product names, blocking path traversal, refusing accidental overwrites, escaping generated HTML/JSX content, and pinning or bundling frontend dependencies.
saas-landing-page.sh:54Output Path Traversal Through Unsanitized Product and Output Values
saas-landing-page.sh:107sed Program Injection Through Unescaped Template Values
saas-landing-page.sh:139Persistent HTML and JSX Injection in Generated Landing Pages
$DESCRIPTION
``` The same values are also inserted into React JSX through the unsafe replacements at lines 107–109 and into the React/Next.js HTML metadata at lines 115–119. ### Technical Analysis The product name and description are embedded directly into HTML text and attribute contexts without contextual output encoding. In particular: - HTML element content can be terminated and followed by attacker-controlled elements. - The description can terminate the quoted `content` attribute in the meta tag. - Attacker-controlled event handlers, script-capable elements, or other active markup can be introduced. - The generated React component treats inserted values as source fragments rather than safely serialized React text. This is a persistent injection vulnerability because the payload is written into generated source ...[truncated 1167 chars]saas-landing-page.sh:120Generated Pages Execute Unpinned Third-Party JavaScript
The manifest description is written as an instruction that the skill generates landing pages, and all surrounding user-facing documentation is exclusively in Chinese with no indication that users can choose another language or locale. This creates a language/locale policy concern because the skill appears to impose a specific language experience without opt-in or justification.
The manifest description is written as an instruction/promise to generate the landing page in Chinese ('生成专业 SaaS Landing Page'). This can indicate a fixed language/locale expectation without offering the user a choice, which matches the policy concern for language constraints lacking opt-in.
This code creates directories and later writes several files into the computed output path, which affects the user's filesystem. Although it prints progress messages, it does not disclose the risk of overwriting existing generated content or warn before modifying files.
No suspicious patterns detected.