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Security audit

Gateway Service

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill openly documents installing OpenClaw Gateway as an auto-starting Windows Scheduled Task, but users should understand it creates persistent local execution.

Install only if you intentionally want OpenClaw Gateway to start automatically at Windows boot and restart after it exits. Because the documented install requires administrator privileges and persists beyond the current session, confirm how to inspect, stop, and fully remove the `OpenClaw Gateway` scheduled task before using it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding
Persistent Gateway Execution Through a Windows Scheduled Task## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 23-27 **Vulnerability Type**: `T06: System Persistence` **Risk Level**: High The following is an English rendering of the complete affected section: ```markdown ## Service Information - **Windows task name**: OpenClaw Gateway - **Startup method**: Automatically starts at boot - **Failure policy**: Automatically restarts after the process exits ``` Related installation instructions at lines 5-11 direct the user to run: ```bash openclaw gateway install ``` The documentation explicitly states that this installation requires administrator privileges. ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs a user to install OpenClaw Gateway as a Windows Scheduled Task. The task starts automatically when Windows boots and restarts the Gateway whenever its process exits. This creates execution persistence across system reboots and user sessions. Scheduled Tasks are a recognized persistence mechanism because they allow a configured executable to run automatically under the task's assigned security principal. Requiring administrator privileges increases the security significance of the installation. If the Gateway executable, its configuration, its plugins, or a path it loads from is later compromised, attacker-controlled behavior could inherit the persistent execution context of the installed task. No evidence of hidden scripts, remote payload retrieval, credential theft, obfuscation, or data exfiltration was found. The persistence behavior is openly documented, but it still falls within the system-persistence classification. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the Skill and opens a privileged administrative environment. 2. The user executes `openclaw gateway install`. 3. OpenClaw creates the `OpenClaw Gateway` Windows Scheduled Task. 4. The task launches the Gateway automatically during system startup. 5. If the Gateway process terminates, the configured failure p ...[truncated 942 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not install the Gateway as an automatically starting Scheduled Task by default. Prefer foreground or explicitly user-initiated execution. 2. Require clear, informed confirmation before creating any persistent task, and display the task name, executable path, arguments, working directory, trigger, restart policy, and security principal. 3. Run the Gateway under a dedicated least-privileged service account rather than an administrator or `SYSTEM` account unless elevated privileges are strictly required. 4. Restrict modification permissions on the Gateway executable, configuration files, plugin directories, and task definition to trusted administrators. 5. Use absolute, securely quoted paths for the task action and avoid loading executables or configuration from user-writable or temporary directories. 6. Provide and document a verified uninstall command or Scheduled Task removal procedure so users can fully disable persistence. 7. Apply bounded restart behavior with retry limits and backoff rather than unconditional restart after every process exit. 8. Record task creation and execution in auditable logs, and monitor unexpected changes to the task action, principal, executable, and configuration. 9. Digitally verify or otherwise integrity-check the Gateway executable and extensions before each upgrade or persistent deployment.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the user to install a Windows Scheduled Task that persists across reboots and restarts the Gateway automatically, but it does not clearly warn that this makes a persistent system change or explain how to remove the task. In a security context, persistence mechanisms are sensitive because they can outlive the user’s session, mask operational problems, and be abused to maintain unwanted software execution.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The file forces a single language presentation without any user opt-in or statement that the skill is intentionally region- or locale-specific. Under the policy, fixed language constraints should either provide a choice or be clearly documented and justified.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.