Skill Security Auditor Jack
Audit third-party or custom skills for permission risk, unsafe commands, and integration safety. Use before: installing a new skill, enabling external script...
MIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
⭐ 0 · 36 · 1 current installs · 1 all-time installs
MIT-0
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Benign
high confidencePurpose & Capability
Name and description match the SKILL.md content: it is an auditor that expects skill metadata and installation details as input. It doesn't request unrelated credentials, binaries, or system access.
Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions define what to inspect (manifests, install steps, env usage, shell commands) and what to flag. The SKILL.md does not instruct the agent to read host secrets or run arbitrary commands itself — it only prescribes checks to perform on provided inputs.
Install Mechanism
No install spec and no code files are provided, so nothing is written to disk or fetched. This reduces risk and is proportional for an instruction-only auditor.
Credentials
The skill declares no required environment variables or credentials. The auditor correctly lists environment-related issues to flag in other skills rather than requesting secrets itself.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and the skill is user-invocable. It does not request persistent or elevated privileges and does not modify other skills' configuration in its instructions.
Assessment
This skill is instruction-only and coherent with its purpose: it defines checks and an output schema but does not itself perform installs or request secrets. Keep in mind: (1) its effectiveness depends on accurate inputs — it will not automatically fetch or verify remote code unless the agent supplies that data; (2) treat its audit as advisory, not authoritative — for high-risk skills follow up with manual code review; (3) when adopting untrusted skills, prefer sandboxed execution or manual review even if the auditor reports low risk. If you want stronger guarantees, run this auditor alongside actual inspections of the install artifacts and source repository rather than relying solely on its textual analysis.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
Current versionv1.0.0
Download ziplatest
License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
SKILL.md
Skill Security Auditor
Audit skills for supply-chain, privilege, and automation risk before adoption.
Input
Required:
skill_manifest— the skill's SKILL.md or metadatasource_location— where the skill comes from (clawhub, git, local, unknown)required_permissions— what permissions the skill requestsshell_commands— any shell/CLI commands referenced by the skillenv_usage— environment variables the skill reads or writesinstall_steps— how the skill is installed / what it runs on install
Output Schema
risk_level: "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical"
suspicious_actions: {
action: string
location: string
severity: "warning" | "critical"
description: string
recommendation: string
}[]
over_privileged_points: {
permission: string
why_needed: string | null
why_excessive: string
recommendation: string
}[]
install_recommendation: "approve" | "approve_with_sandbox" | "reject" | "manual_review"
sandbox_recommendation: {
recommended: boolean
isolation_level: "none" | "process" | "network" | "full"
reasons: string[]
} | null
audit_summary: string # one paragraph honest summary
Risk Levels
| Level | Criteria |
|---|---|
| low | Minimal permissions, no shell, no env secrets, known source |
| medium | Some filesystem access or env usage, known source |
| high | Shell commands, broad permissions, or unknown source |
| critical | Opaque install scripts, secret access, eval/exec patterns |
Suspicious Actions to Flag
eval,exec,Function()— code executioncurl/wgetwith pipe to shell — remote code downloadchmod +x/sudo— privilege escalation- Reading
~/.ssh,/etc/passwd, environment secrets - Network calls to unknown hosts
- Base64-encoded or obfuscated commands
- Install scripts that fetch from unknown URLs
Over-Privileged Points to Flag
- Filesystem access beyond the skill's stated scope
- Broad
readpermissions on entire directories writeaccess to system paths- Environment variables containing tokens/keys
- Network access not strictly needed for stated function
Source Trust Levels
| Source | Trust |
|---|---|
| ClawHub verified | medium (review anyway) |
| Known git repo | medium |
| Local skill | high |
| Unknown URL | low |
| Copy-pasted code | very low |
Rules
- Never default-approve high-privilege skills. Burden of proof is on the skill, not the auditor.
- Flag remote install scripts and opaque shell chains. If you can't see what runs, flag it.
- Flag access to secrets, env vars, filesystem, or network where not strictly needed.
- Recommend isolation for untrusted skills. Better safe than sorry.
Failure Handling
If source trust cannot be established:
- Default to
risk_level = "high"minimum - Recommend
rejectormanual_review - Do not fabricate a clean audit
- Explicitly state what could not be verified
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