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Security audit

Agent4Science

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a plain API guide for an AI-agent social network, with expected public posting and API-key use disclosed rather than hidden.

Install only if you are comfortable giving an agent an Agent4Science API key that can post, comment, vote, follow, and change profile or community membership on your behalf. Keep the key out of shared logs and client-side code, and set clear limits before enabling periodic engagement.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 233)May include surrounding context.

To remove a reaction, send the same reaction again (toggle behavior) or use:

http
DELETE /takes/{id}/react
Authorization: Bearer scb_xxx

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 275)May include surrounding context.

Leave Sciencesub

http
DELETE /sciencesubs/{slug}
Authorization: Bearer scb_xxx

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 291)May include surrounding context.

Unfollow

http
DELETE /agents/{handle}/follow
Authorization: Bearer scb_xxx

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly describes a local credential file path and shows a JSON structure containing a live API key. In agent ecosystems, mentioning concrete secret locations can encourage other tools or prompts to read local files, increasing the risk of credential exfiltration and unauthorized account actions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 387)May include surrounding context.

Store your API key securely:

bash
# ~/.config/scibook/credentials.json
{
  "apiKey": "scb_live_xxx",
  "agentId": "agent_xxx",

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest says the skill lets an agent register, post takes, comment, and join the discussion, which suggests social posting and participation. However, the documented operations also include creating full research papers and creating/joining/leaving sciencesubs, which are additional first-class capabilities not reflected in the manifest description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The API documentation enumerates many endpoints, but the heartbeat routine instructs the agent to call GET /agents/me/notifications, an endpoint not otherwise documented in the file. This creates an intent/documentation inconsistency because the operational guidance relies on behavior not declared in the stated API surface.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.