T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:36- Finding
Command Injection Through Conversation-Derived Travel Location
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill does what it says at a high level, but it stores sensitive travel data automatically and documents unsafe shell-style commands using conversation-derived locations.
Review this skill before installing. It is not clearly malicious, but only use it if you are comfortable with an agent storing your home city and travel schedule, automatically updating that file from chat, and running the documented commands. Prefer a revised version that requires confirmation before saving trips, validates locations, URL-encodes weather requests, and invokes scripts/curl with structured arguments rather than shell-interpolated strings.
SKILL.md:36Command Injection Through Conversation-Derived Travel Location
references/morning-briefing.md:20Delayed Command Injection Through the Weather Query
The declared purpose suggests a simple weather-location adjustment, but the skill also performs persistent data mutation, cleanup/deletion of stored entries, and cron/CLI-style maintenance behavior. This mismatch can mislead users and reviewers about the real capabilities of the skill, causing them to approve or invoke behavior that alters stored personal data beyond the advertised function.
The README explicitly promotes automatic capture of travel plans from conversation and persistent storage, but it does not warn users that potentially sensitive itinerary/location data will be extracted and retained. Travel history and future presence information are privacy-sensitive; silent collection increases the risk of unintended disclosure, over-collection, or user surprise in environments where conversation logs may contain personal schedules.
The installation and setup instructions tell users to create memory/travel-plan.json, but the README does not clearly disclose that the skill will later write to and automatically modify this file, including cleanup of past entries. Undocumented autonomous modification of persistent memory can affect user trust, create integrity issues for shared agent state, and expose sensitive travel data if users assume the file is static or manually managed.
The skill reads and writes persistent memory data but does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That creates an authorization transparency gap: reviewers and users cannot easily tell that the skill can modify local state, which increases the risk of unintended persistence or misuse if the surrounding agent grants broad file capabilities.
The skill instructs the agent to create a persistent travel-plan file containing home city and future locations derived from conversation, but it does not require clear user notice or consent for storing this personal travel data. Travel history and home location are sensitive contextual data and can expose routine, whereabouts, or household absence if retained without informed consent.
Hard-coding Asia/Shanghai for invocation and date resolution can cause the skill to use the wrong day or briefing time for users in other regions, which may incorrectly select or expire travel locations. While not a direct security exploit by itself, it can lead to privacy-affecting mistakes or integrity issues in user-specific data handling.
The instruction to update travel data proactively whenever the user mentions travel plans causes automatic persistence of conversation-derived personal information without a warning at the point of capture. This is especially risky because users may mention tentative or sensitive travel in ordinary conversation without expecting it to be stored and later acted upon.
The file presents its title, triggers, workflow, and example responses exclusively in Chinese, including the mandated assistant reply. This can constitute a language-policy issue if the skill forces a specific language without giving the user an opt-in choice or stating that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context.
The document instructs the agent to proactively capture travel details from conversation and automatically write them into travel-plan.json without any explicit consent gate, retention notice, or warning that stored user data will be modified. Because travel plans are sensitive location and schedule data, silent persistence increases privacy risk and can lead to unauthorized profile building or incorrect downstream behavior if the extraction is wrong.
This markdown file presents key operational guidance, field descriptions, update commands, and safety rules entirely in Chinese, while the title is in English. That creates a language policy concern because the skill documentation effectively forces a specific language without any user opt-in or stated region-specific justification.
The module docstring, CLI help text, comments, and printed status/error messages are all written in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users. The file does not offer any locale selection or indicate that the tool is intentionally region-specific, so this is a natural-language policy concern.
The JSON file specifies destination cities exclusively in France for multiple dates, which can reflect a fixed locale-specific configuration without any indication that the user opted into that locale or that the restriction is justified. Under the policy rule for natural-language locale constraints, hard-coded location assumptions can be problematic when no choice or rationale is provided.
The module docstring and all user-facing usage text are written only in Chinese, and the script also hard-codes a UTC+8 timezone assumption. This imposes a specific language/locale context without offering any user choice or documenting that the skill is intentionally region-specific.