T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
assets/server.py:135- Finding
Directory Traversal in the Project Logs API
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed multi-agent coding workflow, but its local dashboard and broad agent permissions create review-worthy exposure of project files and logs.
Install only in a dedicated project workspace or container, keep the dashboard bound to localhost, do not keep secrets or credentials in that workspace, and stop preview/dashboard servers when done. Before wider use, fix the logs path traversal, restrict file-serving to an allowlist, sanitize rendered markdown, and pin or vendor frontend and npx dependencies.
assets/server.py:135Directory Traversal in the Project Logs API
assets/server.py:229Unauthenticated Static-File Access Exposes the Entire Workspace
assets/dashboard.html:7Unpinned Third-Party JavaScript Executes in the Dashboard Origin
The declared description suggests a core capability centered on active multi-agent software engineering workflows (orchestration, code building, review, and iterative collaboration). The supplied code does not implement agent coordination, code generation, module decomposition, or review logic. Instead, it is a local dashboard/web server for viewing project states and logs and serving related files. This is a materially different primary purpose, so the description does not accurately represent the code chunk.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Dashboard is included in `assets/server.py` and `assets/dashboard.html`.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Dashboard is included in `assets/server.py` and `assets/dashboard.html`.
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</head>
<body class="bg-gray-50 min-h-screen">
<div id="app" v-cloak>
<!-- Header -->
<header class="bg-white shadow-sm border-b">
<div class="max-w-7xl mx-auto px-4 py-4">
<div class="flex items-center justify-between">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Pending Request Banner -->
<div v-if="currentProject && currentProject.is_request" class="bg-gradient-to-r from-yellow-500 to-orange-500 rounded-lg shadow-lg p-6 mb-6 text-white">
<div>
<h2 class="text-2xl font-bold">⏳ {{ currentProject.name.replace('[待启动] ', '') }}</h2>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Task List -->
<div v-if="currentProject && !currentProject.is_request" class="bg-white rounded-lg shadow">
<div class="px-4 py-3 border-b border-gray-200">
<h2 class="text-lg font-bold text-gray-900">任务列表</h2>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Progress Info -->
<div v-if="module.progress" class="flex items-center gap-4 text-xs text-gray-500">
<span>迭代:{{ module.progress.review_iterations || 0 }} 轮</span>
<span v-if="module.progress.started_at">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Progress Info -->
<div v-if="module.progress" class="flex items-center gap-4 text-xs text-gray-500">
<span>迭代:{{ module.progress.review_iterations || 0 }} 轮</span>
<span v-if="module.progress.started_at">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<div v-for="(it, index) in module.review_history" :key="index"
class="rounded-lg overflow-hidden border"
:class="getIterationBorderClass(it.status)">
<!-- Header bar -->
<div class="flex items-center justify-between px-3 py-2"
:class="getIterationBgClass(it.status)">
<div class="flex items-center gap-2">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<!-- Detail panel -->
<div v-if="isIterationExpanded(module.module_id, it.iteration)" class="px-3 py-3 bg-white space-y-3">
<!-- Parsed checklist -->
<div v-if="getParsedChecks(it.summary).length > 0">
<p class="text-xs font-medium text-gray-500 mb-1.5">检查项:</p>
<div class="space-y-1">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<div v-for="(line, li) in getNonCheckLines(it.summary)" :key="li">{{ line }}</div>
</div>
<!-- Feedback (only if different from summary) -->
<div v-if="it.feedback && !isSameAsSummary(it.summary, it.feedback)" class="pt-3 border-t border-gray-100">
<p class="text-xs font-medium text-gray-500 mb-1">反馈:</p>
<div class="text-xs text-gray-600 space-y-1 leading-relaxed" v-html="renderMarkdown(it.feedback)"></div>
The skill instructs users to run a local dashboard server, read and write project files, and use agent/session capabilities, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That mismatch can cause overbroad tool access at install/runtime, making it easier for the skill to read sensitive files or invoke unintended capabilities without clear user review.
Using npx playwright without a pinned version allows whatever version is current at execution time to be fetched and run, which weakens supply-chain integrity and reproducibility. A compromised or breaking upstream release could introduce malicious code execution or unsafe behavior into the review workflow.
This HTML file declares lang="zh-CN", and the visible UI strings throughout the page are presented only in Chinese. Under the policy rule for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language/locale without user opt-in or justification is a reportable issue.
The dashboard renders agent-supplied markdown via markdown-it and injects the resulting HTML with Vue's v-html, but there is no sanitization step. Because review feedback and handoff summaries are attacker-controlled in this threat model, malicious HTML or script-capable payloads can execute in the operator's browser, turning a passive monitoring UI into an XSS sink.
The manifest describes a multi-agent development system for decomposing modules, implementing code, and reviewing quality, but this file adds a local HTTP API that enumerates and serves agent log contents from project directories. Hosting a dashboard/log-serving interface is not an obvious or declared requirement of the stated coding/orchestration purpose, especially because it exposes internal execution data over an HTTP surface.
The code serves files from the skill base directory, including arbitrary paths under /projects/, /archive/, and other static files under BASE_DIR, turning the skill into a local file-hosting web server. A deep-coding multi-agent skill may reasonably read project state internally, but publishing those files through HTTP is a separate capability not justified by the manifest's stated purpose.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
The manifest describes a multi-agent development system for decomposing projects, implementing code, and reviewing quality. These instructions go beyond code review and orchestration by explicitly directing agents to start HTTP servers (python3 -m http.server or npx serve) and interact with running services, which is an operational capability not declared in the stated purpose.
The delivery workflow instructs the orchestrator to start and keep a local web server running, publish a localhost URL, and delay cleanup until user confirmation or timeout. That expands the skill from build/review orchestration into persistent service operation, increasing attack surface and creating opportunities for unintended data exposure, stale services, or misuse of local resources.
The delivery workflow defines accepted user responses using Chinese phrases alongside a couple of English terms, but provides no explicit language choice or opt-in. This can bias the skill toward a specific locale for completion handling and may exclude users communicating in other languages.
This code prepends the Chinese label "[待启动]" to request names for display, which imposes a specific language in the UI. The file does not indicate any user opt-in, locale selection, or justification for restricting output to Chinese.