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Security audit

Sell Live Dataset

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not malicious, but it should be reviewed because it can authenticate and publish user data as a public paid API without a required pre-publication safety check.

Install only if you intentionally want to publish and monetize a dataset through SettleMesh. Before running it, verify the CLI source and version, use a scoped API key, confirm the exact app and routes that will become public, review the dataset for secrets, personal data, confidential or licensed content, and make sure you know how to disable the endpoint and revoke credentials.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party CLI

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:5
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned npm dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

yaml
compatibility: "Requires the settlemesh CLI (npm i -g settlemesh) and a SETTLE_API_KEY; makes authenticated, metered calls to the SettleMesh platform over the network."

Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends installing settlemesh directly from npm using a global installation command without specifying a reviewed version or package-integrity value. Consequently, the installed implementation is determined by whichever release the npm registry resolves as current at installation time.

npm packages can execute lifecycle scripts during installation. If the package, its publisher account, the registry resolution process, or a transitive dependency is compromised, installation could execute attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the invoking user. A global installation also increases the affected scope by placing package files or executable shims in a shared installation prefix.

The Skill subsequently requires access to SETTLE_API_KEY and cached authentication state. A malicious CLI release could therefore access credentials when invoked, alter deployment content, manipulate pricing operations, or transmit local information externally.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm package, a maintainer account, or one of the package's dependencies.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release or causes dependency resolution to retrieve a malicious component.
  3. A user follows the documented npm i -g settlemesh instruction without a version or integrity constraint.
  4. Malicious lifecycle code executes during installation, or malicious code runs when the CLI is later invoked.
  5. The code accesses data available to the invoking account, potentially including SETTLE_API_KEY, cached SettleMesh session data, ...[truncated 898 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the CLI to an explicitly reviewed version, such as settlemesh@x.y.z, instead of resolving the latest release.
  • Record and verify package integrity metadata through a lockfile or an equivalent cryptographic verification mechanism.
  • Identify the authoritative npm package and official source repository so users can verify publisher ownership.
  • Prefer a project-local installation over npm install -g to reduce the installation scope.
  • Review the package and its dependency tree before upgrades.
  • Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where operationally feasible, and enable only scripts that have been reviewed.
  • Run the CLI in a minimally privileged environment with access only to the files and credentials necessary for the requested deployment.
  • Do not expose SETTLE_API_KEY to package installation processes; inject it only when an authenticated operation is actually performed.
  • Rotate the API key and invalidate cached sessions if package compromise is suspected.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Public Dataset Deployment Without a Mandatory Data-Sensitivity Review

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:27-34
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe public deployment workflow
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
## 1. Deploy the app that serves your data

Your data needs a live endpoint first. Use the **`ship-paid-app`** skill — it
gives you a `*.run.settlemesh.io` URL, a managed DB, and a runtime key:

```bash
settlemesh deploy ./my-api --framework container --full-stack --wait --json

Read the app_id and live URL from the JSON. Your endpoint(s) (e.g. a /query route over the dataset) now respond publicly.

text

### Technical Analysis

The workflow directs the agent to deploy an arbitrary dataset-backed application and explicitly states that its endpoints become public. It does not require a pre-deployment review for credentials, personal data, confidential records, intellectual-property restrictions, scrape authorization, or applicable data-retention requirements.

It also does not require authentication or authorization controls for the underlying public data endpoint before deployment. Per-call pricing is a billing control and is not, by itself, a confidentiality control. If the deployed application exposes an unprotected route, callers may be able to access data directly through the public URL rather than through the intended paid operation.

Because the Skill is designed to accept a broad range of scrapes and datasets, the omission creates a generic disclosure path whenever source material includes sensitive or restricted content.

### Attack Path

1. A dataset or scrape contains API keys, personal information, confidential business records, licensed content, or data collected without sufficient publication rights.
2. The agent follows the Skill and packages that data in `./my-api`.
3. The deployment command sends the application and its data to third-party infrastructure.
4. The resulting endpoint becomes publicly reachable as docum
...[truncated 1137 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Require explicit human approval immediately before any public deployment.
  • Add a mandatory pre-deployment classification step covering personal data, credentials, confidential information, intellectual property, scrape authorization, and contractual restrictions.
  • Scan the application and dataset for secrets and sensitive data before upload, and block deployment on positive findings until reviewed.
  • Default new endpoints to private and authenticated operation rather than public access.
  • Require route-level authorization and verify that direct access cannot bypass the priced API operation.
  • Apply strict query validation, record-level authorization, pagination limits, rate limits, and controls against bulk extraction.
  • Publish only the minimum fields necessary for the intended service and redact or tokenize sensitive values.
  • Document the third-party platform's retention, deletion, backup, and incident-response behavior before uploading data.
  • Add a post-deployment test that attempts unauthenticated direct access to every route and fails the workflow if protected data is returned.
  • Provide an emergency process to disable the endpoint, revoke exposed credentials, delete hosted data, and notify affected parties after accidental disclosure.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The invocation description is extremely broad and can match many ordinary requests about datasets, scraping, APIs, or monetization, causing the agent to activate a skill that performs public publishing and billing-related actions without sufficiently narrow user intent. In this skill's context, over-triggering is more dangerous because the described workflow can expose a live endpoint, create a priced public service, and lead to unexpected network and commercial side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to proceed with authentication and deployment-oriented actions without an upfront warning that it may publish a publicly reachable paid API and enable billed network operations. This is dangerous because a user asking for help with a dataset could be led into exposing data externally or incurring financial and reputational consequences without an explicit informed-consent checkpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.