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Security audit

Charge My Users

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for SettleMesh end-user billing, but it pushes the agent to initiate payment-platform login and install an unpinned global CLI, so users should review it carefully before use.

Install only if you are comfortable using SettleMesh for payment-related billing. Prefer pinning the settlemesh CLI version, reviewing the package before global installation, setting SETTLE_API_KEY only at runtime, and requiring explicit confirmation before any login, session caching, spending, or credential-lending step.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Unpinned Global npm Dependency Installation

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installed globally
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

yaml
compatibility: "Requires the settlemesh CLI (npm i -g settlemesh) and a SETTLE_API_KEY; makes authenticated, metered calls to the SettleMesh platform over the network."

Technical Analysis

The skill directs users to install the settlemesh npm package globally without specifying an exact version, lockfile, integrity hash, or other provenance verification. Consequently, the code installed and executed may differ from the version assessed during this audit.

npm packages can execute lifecycle scripts during installation. If the package, its publisher account, registry entry, or a transitive dependency is compromised, a later installation could execute attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the user running npm. Global installation also places the executable in a shared command path, increasing its reach beyond this individual skill invocation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the settlemesh npm package, its publisher account, or a dependency included in a later release.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version or introduces a malicious installation lifecycle script.
  3. A user or agent follows the documented command:
    bash
    npm i -g settlemesh
    
  4. npm retrieves the current unpinned release and executes its installation behavior.
  5. Attacker-controlled code runs with the installing user's privileges.
  6. The malicious code may inspect accessible files, npm configuration, cached SettleMesh sessions, or environment variables such as SETTLE_API_KEY, and may replace the globally available settlemesh executable.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. The affected scope may include readab ...[truncated 469 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the CLI to an exact reviewed version, for example:
    bash
    npm install --global settlemesh@X.Y.Z
    
  2. Document the expected package integrity hash and verify package provenance before installation.
  3. Prefer a project-local, lockfile-controlled dependency over global installation where operationally possible.
  4. Install and execute the CLI in a restricted environment with only the minimum filesystem, network, and credential access required.
  5. Review the package's lifecycle scripts and transitive dependency tree before approving version upgrades.
  6. Avoid exposing SETTLE_API_KEY during installation; provide it only to the reviewed executable at runtime.
  7. Establish an explicit upgrade process so newly published versions are reviewed before the pinned version is changed.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description lists several activation phrases such as "charge my users," "let users pay per use," and "paywall" without explicit scoping or negative examples. Some of these are broad product-language terms that could overlap with general discussion about monetization rather than this specific SettleMesh end-user billing workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run settlemesh login on the user's behalf and to 'drive it' rather than asking the user to log in manually. Even though browser approval is described as a one-time human approval, initiating an authentication flow autonomously can surprise users, trigger credential-lending behavior, and normalize agent-led auth actions in a payment-related context. In a billing skill, this is more dangerous because it conditions the agent to move toward authenticated, spend-enabling state transitions without a clear user-facing consent checkpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.