Back to skill

Security audit

Agent Cron Service

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent SettleMesh scheduling helper, but users should understand it signs into a third-party service and can create metered recurring jobs.

Before installing, confirm that you want SettleMesh specifically to run persistent, metered scheduled jobs. Prefer a pinned CLI version if available, avoid sudo/global installs where possible, use limited-scope credentials, and review spend caps before creating or resuming schedules.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party Executable Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 32
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npm install -g settlemesh@latest

Technical Analysis

The setup instructions install the SettleMesh CLI globally from npm using the mutable latest distribution tag. This does not establish a reproducible, reviewed dependency version. Consequently, the code executed during installation and subsequent CLI use may differ from the version that was assessed when the skill was published.

An npm package can execute code through installation lifecycle scripts and through its installed command-line entry point. Because the package is installed globally, malicious code would run with the privileges of the user performing the installation and could affect files or commands outside the project directory. The skill subsequently provides the CLI with access to the SETTLE_API_KEY environment variable and an authenticated cached session, increasing the sensitivity of the execution context.

The audit found no evidence that the current SettleMesh package is malicious. The issue is the unsafe dependency acquisition practice and the resulting supply-chain exposure.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm package publisher account, package distribution process, or another component of the dependency supply chain.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the latest tag.
  3. A user follows the documented setup command.
  4. npm retrieves the attacker-controlled release and installs it globally.
  5. Malicious lifecycle code may execute during installation, or malicious code may execute when a later settlemesh command is invoked.
  6. The payload runs with the installing user's privileges and may attempt to access the authenticated session, SETTLE_API_KEY, user files, or other resources available to that account.

Impact Assessment

Succe ...[truncated 651 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace @latest with an exact, reviewed package version, for example:
    bash
    npm install -g settlemesh@1.2.3
    
  2. Establish a controlled update process that reviews and tests each new version before changing the documented pin.
  3. Publish and verify package provenance, integrity metadata, and the identity of the official npm publisher.
  4. Prefer a project-local installation with a lockfile over a global installation where operationally feasible.
  5. If the package does not require npm lifecycle scripts, consider installation with --ignore-scripts after confirming that doing so preserves required functionality:
    bash
    npm install -g --ignore-scripts settlemesh@1.2.3
    
  6. Advise users not to perform the installation as root or through sudo, and run the CLI under a least-privileged account.
  7. Limit the scope and spending authority of API credentials, rotate credentials if compromise is suspected, and protect cached authentication data with restrictive filesystem permissions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill description is very broad and matches many generic requests about cron jobs, scheduled tasks, recurring jobs, and background work. That increases the chance the agent invokes this skill in contexts where the user did not specifically intend to authorize a hosted third-party service, external deployment, or metered billing, leading to unintended network actions and account usage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run settlemesh whoami and, if needed, initiate settlemesh login on the user's behalf, while telling it not to stop and ask the user to log in manually. This normalizes autonomous authentication and cached session creation with a third-party platform, which can trigger browser-based consent flows, establish persistent credentials, and lead to subsequent authenticated, metered actions without a clear user-facing authorization checkpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.