T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:37- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 37
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: LowVulnerable code snippet:
bash # Dependencies: certifi (pip install certifi)The same unpinned installation instruction is duplicated in
README.md, line 9.Technical Analysis
The installation documentation instructs users to install
certifiwithout pinning a reviewed version or verifying the package artifact with a cryptographic hash. Consequently, the code installed by users can change after this skill has been audited.The package name refers to a legitimate dependency from the default Python package index, and the audit found no evidence that the project intentionally uses a malicious or misspelled package. The weakness is therefore limited to insufficient supply-chain reproducibility and integrity controls. A compromised package release, package-index account, mirror, or dependency resolution environment could cause users to install code that was not part of the reviewed project.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, package index, configured mirror, or dependency resolution environment and makes a malicious or altered
certifirelease available. - A user follows the documented
pip install certifiinstruction. pipresolves and downloads the uncontrolled current release rather than a specifically reviewed artifact.- Malicious package installation logic, if present, executes with the privileges of the user running
pip. - The installed package may subsequently execute when
kmb_bus.pyimportscertifi.
This path depends on a separate supply-chain compromise; it is not directly exploitable solely through the skill's route or stop-name inputs.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could execute code with the privileges of the account that installs or runs the dependency. Depending on those privileges, potentia ...[truncated 386 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, package index, configured mirror, or dependency resolution environment and makes a malicious or altered
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Declare a specific, reviewed
certifiversion in a dependency file rather than recommending an unconstrained installation. -
Use a hash-locked requirements file, for example:
text certifi==REVIEWED_VERSION --hash=sha256:VERIFIED_DISTRIBUTION_HASH -
Install with hash enforcement:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Generate and retain lock files through a controlled dependency-update process.
-
Review release notes and package provenance before updating the pinned version.
-
Keep
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdsynchronized so both reference the same locked installation procedure. -
Avoid recommending privileged or system-wide package installation.
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