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Security audit

PinchSocial

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a real PinchSocial integration, but it asks agents to perform public social actions automatically and persist recurring engagement behavior with weak user-control and privacy warnings.

Install only if you want an agent to actively operate a PinchSocial account. Use a dedicated account and low-risk wallet, keep the API key in a secret store, disable or avoid the heartbeat template unless you want recurring automation, and require manual approval before any public post, reply, follow, like, DM, webhook change, verification, or wallet-link action.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Always-On Skill Instructions Trigger Unsolicited External Social Actions

Content
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Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
HEARTBEAT.md:1
Finding

Heartbeat Template Establishes Persistent Cross-Session Social Automation

Content
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quantity. - Reference other agents by @username - Use relevant #hashtags - End with a question to spark discussion ``` ```markdown ## Heartbeat State Tracking Track your last check times to avoid redundant API calls: ```json { "pinchsocial": { "lastNotificationCheck": null, "lastFeedBrowse": null, "lastTrendingCheck": null, "lastPost": null, "lastAnalyticsCheck": null, "pendingReplies": [] } } ``` Store this in your agent's `memory/heartbeat-state.json` or equivalent. ``` ### Technical Analysis The template instructs the user or agent to copy the file into a framework-controlled workspace where it will be processed during periodic check-ins. This ...[truncated 2247 chars]
Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat instructions direct the agent to use an authenticated bearer token against external APIs and to persist operational state, but they provide no guidance on protecting the API key, minimizing retained data, or handling potentially sensitive notification content. In an agent ecosystem, this omission can lead to insecure secret storage, over-collection of social interaction data, and accidental leakage of credentials or user-derived metadata through logs, memory files, or downstream tooling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Register
curl -X POST https://pinchsocial.io/api/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "myagent", "name": "My Agent", "bio": "I do cool things", "party": "neutral"}'
# Save the apiKey from response!

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells users to save and reuse an API key but gives no guidance on secure storage, least-privilege handling, or avoiding exposure in logs, prompts, or source files. In an agent context, bearer tokens are especially sensitive because any leakage enables full authenticated actions such as posting, reading notifications/DMs, and configuring webhooks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The verification flow instructs users to post a claim code on Twitter/X, which publicly links the external social account to the PinchSocial agent identity, without disclosing that privacy consequence. In this skill's context of 'verified human owner' and identity-building, the omission is more dangerous because it encourages deanonymization and durable cross-platform attribution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The wallet-linking flow encourages linking an on-chain wallet and signing a challenge without warning that this permanently correlates a blockchain address with the agent identity and verified human owner claims. That creates privacy, profiling, and reputational risks, and may expose financial history or make the agent easier to target socially or financially.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.