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Security audit

Booking.com hotels

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a legitimate hotel-search integration, but it asks the agent to persist an API key in an unspecified place across future sessions.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill access to StayingAPI. Prefer a sandbox stay_test_ key for evaluation, avoid storing a live key in project files or shell profiles, and use your agent/runtime secret store or another protected credential manager if persistence is needed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/auth-setup.md:5
Finding

Ambiguous Persistent Storage of API Credentials May Expose Live Keys

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/auth-setup.md, lines 5–10 and 27–31
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext credential storage in an unspecified persistent configuration
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
This guide gets you a StayingAPI key and persists it so it survives across sessions.

## Step 0 — how to store an env var on this system

Figure out the correct way to persist an environment variable on this machine so it is available in every future session (a shell profile, or a config/env file managed by your agent runtime). The variable name is `STAYINGAPI_KEY`.
markdown
## Step 2 — store it

```bash
export STAYINGAPI_KEY="stay_live_…"   # or stay_test_… for the sandbox
text

### Technical Analysis

The setup guide directs the agent to determine how to persist `STAYINGAPI_KEY` in a shell profile or an agent-runtime configuration file. It does not constrain the destination, require explicit user approval before modifying persistent configuration, prescribe restrictive file permissions, or require an operating-system credential manager or runtime secret store.

A live API key stored in plaintext may consequently be written to a shared, broadly readable, backed-up, logged, or version-controlled file. The sample `export` command only configures the current process or shell session by itself, while the preceding persistence instruction implicitly requires an additional file modification whose security properties are left unspecified.

This is an insecure credential-handling practice rather than evidence of intentional credential exfiltration. The reviewed files explicitly identify StayingAPI as the API recipient, and no unrelated credential destination was found.

### Attack Path

1. A user invokes the Skill without `STAYINGAPI_KEY` already configured.
2. The Skill follows the setup guide and selects a shell profile or agent-runtime configuration file for persistent storage.
3. A live `stay_live_…` key 
...[truncated 1149 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Default to session-scoped credential injection instead of persistent storage.
  2. If persistence is necessary, request explicit user approval before modifying any shell profile or runtime configuration.
  3. Prefer an operating-system credential manager, encrypted secret store, or the agent runtime’s designated secrets facility.
  4. Never place the key in project directories, repository-tracked files, command history, logs, or diagnostic output.
  5. If a plaintext environment file is unavoidable, store it outside the repository, apply owner-only permissions such as mode 0600, and ensure parent directories are not accessible to unauthorized users.
  6. Add explicit ignore rules and secret-scanning controls to prevent accidental source-control commits.
  7. Recommend sandbox keys for evaluation and reserve live keys for actual live-data requests.
  8. Document key rotation and revocation procedures and advise immediate rotation if exposure is suspected.
  9. Clarify that the displayed export command is session-scoped and provide separate, platform-specific secure persistence guidance rather than instructing the agent to select an unspecified file.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

Step 3 — verify

bash
curl -s "https://api.stayingapi.com/v1/account" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STAYINGAPI_KEY" | head

A 200 with your account envelope means the key works. A missing/invalid key returns 401 authentication_error (never billed). Full contract: https://api.stayingapi.com/openapi.json.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

Step 3 — verify

bash
curl -s "https://api.stayingapi.com/v1/account" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STAYINGAPI_KEY" | head

A 200 with your account envelope means the key works. A missing/invalid key returns 401 authentication_error (never billed). Full contract: https://api.stayingapi.com/openapi.json.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

Step 3 — verify

bash
curl -s "https://api.stayingapi.com/v1/account" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STAYINGAPI_KEY" | head

A 200 with your account envelope means the key works. A missing/invalid key returns 401 authentication_error (never billed). Full contract: https://api.stayingapi.com/openapi.json.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

Step 3 — verify

bash
curl -s "https://api.stayingapi.com/v1/account" -H "Authorization: Bearer $STAYINGAPI_KEY" | head

A 200 with your account envelope means the key works. A missing/invalid key returns 401 authentication_error (never billed). Full contract: https://api.stayingapi.com/openapi.json.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.