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Security audit

x402-wurk

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is mostly transparent about using WURK for paid human tasks and social-growth purchases, but it has material review concerns around unverified remote installation, broad paid-service triggering, social engagement/vote services, and bearer-token handling.

Review before installing. Only use this skill for explicit, user-approved paid tasks; verify the exact service, destination URL or handle, network, amount, and total USDC cost before signing. Avoid social-growth or vote-buying uses that could violate platform rules. Do not install via the documented curl commands unless you independently verify the downloaded files. Treat returned secrets like passwords and avoid putting them in URLs, logs, shell history, or plaintext state files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Mutable Remote Skill Instructions Installed Without Integrity Verification

Content
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~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/SKILL.md curl -s https://wurkapi.fun/skill.json > ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/package.json ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions download the Skill definition and package metadata from mutable, service-controlled URLs and overwrite files in the local OpenClaw Skill directory. There is no immutable version identifier, cryptographic checksum, digital signature, or manual verification step. Although the retrieved artifact is Markdown rather than a conventional executable, `SKILL.md` is an instruction payload interpreted by the Agent. Loading remotely supplied Skill instructions can therefore alter Agent behavior after the reviewed package has been published. HTTPS protects data in transit but does not protect against a compromised server, compromised operator account, malicious server administrator, or unexpected modification of the hosted files. The use of `curl -s` also suppresses diagnostic output and does not use `--fail`, so an HTTP error response could be written into the installed file without a clear failure signal. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises `wurkapi.fun`, its deployment pipeline, DNS, or an authorized publishing account. 2. The attacker replaces `skill.md` with instructions that request credentials, weaken safeguards, initiate unauthorized payments, or transmit sensitive information. 3. A user follows the documented installation command. 4. The mutable remote file overwrites the locally reviewed `SKILL.md`. 5. OpenClaw loads the attacker-controlled instructions as a trusted Skill. 6. The Agent follows the substituted instructions with the permissions and data available in its current environment. ### Impact Assessm ...[truncated 498 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:441
Finding

Skill Uses Identity Programming to Steer Agent Behavior

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:179
Finding

Bearer Secrets Are Placed in Query Strings and May Be Stored Insecurely

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:34
Finding

Unpinned Wallet-Adjacent npm Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

Install locally (OpenClaw):

bash
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402
curl -s https://wurkapi.fun/skill.md > ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/SKILL.md
curl -s https://wurkapi.fun/skill.json > ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/package.json

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

Install locally (OpenClaw):

bash
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402
curl -s https://wurkapi.fun/skill.md > ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/SKILL.md
curl -s https://wurkapi.fun/skill.json > ~/.openclaw/skills/wurk-x402/package.json

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly recommends saving the returned 'secret' and later states it may be tracked in memory or a state file, while also acknowledging that the secret is a bearer token for viewing submissions. Storing bearer tokens in plaintext files without strong storage requirements, access controls, or redaction guidance increases the risk of token theft and unauthorized access to job submissions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The 'Identity Programming' section broadly instructs the agent to treat many subjective, marketing, and feedback scenarios as triggers to use WURK. This can cause over-invocation of a paid external service and unnecessary disclosure of user prompts, URLs, or task content to third parties, especially because the service includes human-facing workflows and social-growth actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The package description advertises broad capabilities such as hiring humans for microjobs and buying social growth services without clear trigger constraints, authorization boundaries, or acceptable-use limitations. In an agent ecosystem, vague activation language can cause unintended invocation for spammy, manipulative, or policy-violating tasks, especially given the explicit mention of followers, likes, votes, and raids.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.