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Security audit

Opencollab Autolist

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a marketplace automation helper, but it asks the agent to use credentials, alter a public profile, submit proposals, and discover live API authentication through web search without clear approval boundaries.

Review this carefully before installing. Only use it with narrowly scoped, revocable OpenCollab credentials, verify the official API endpoint yourself, and require manual approval before any profile changes, skill listings, account registration, or proposal submissions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:46
Finding
Untrusted API Discovery for Authenticated and State-Changing Operations## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 46-55 **Vulnerability Type**: Untrusted endpoint and authentication discovery **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown ## API Notes OpenCollab uses a REST API for: - GET /jobs — list available jobs - POST /proposals — submit proposal - GET /profile — get current profile (Use web search to find current API endpoints and authentication method) ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the agent to discover API endpoints and authentication procedures through unrestricted web search. It does not provide a pinned official HTTPS origin, trusted documentation URL, hostname allowlist, redirect restrictions, or requirements for independently validating the service identity. This is particularly unsafe because the described workflow involves account credentials and `POST /proposals`, an authenticated, state-changing operation. Search results and third-party documentation are untrusted inputs. Search poisoning, sponsored results, compromised documentation, or look-alike domains could cause the agent to follow an attacker-controlled authentication flow or send sensitive tokens to an unauthorized endpoint. The package contains no scripts implementing the proposed controls or operations, so this finding concerns the unsafe instruction and configuration practice in `SKILL.md`, not a confirmed credential-theft implementation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker publishes or promotes a convincing page claiming to document the current OpenCollab API. 2. The agent follows the instruction to locate endpoints and authentication methods through web search. 3. The malicious page supplies an attacker-controlled API hostname or credential-exchange procedure. 4. The agent authenticates against that endpoint or includes a token in subsequent requests. 5. The attacker captures credentials or tokens and may use them to access the victim's marketplace accoun ...[truncated 605 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the verified official API base URL and official documentation URL directly in the Skill. 2. Require HTTPS and enforce an explicit hostname allowlist for authentication and API requests. 3. Reject cross-origin redirects and verify the final request origin before attaching credentials. 4. Obtain API tokens only through the service's verified authentication flow and store them in an approved secret manager. 5. Never disclose tokens, passwords, private keys, or session cookies to search results, web pages, logs, prompts, or proposal content. 6. Use narrowly scoped, revocable credentials with the minimum permissions and lifetime required. 7. Require explicit user confirmation before account registration, profile publication, or proposal submission. 8. Add request previews, destination validation, audit logging, rate limits, and a dry-run mode for all state-changing operations. 9. Provide the referenced implementation files and subject their authentication, redirect handling, logging, and secret-management behavior to a separate code review before execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly states it will register accounts, create or modify profile content, post skills, and bid on jobs, but it does not warn the user that these are externally visible, potentially irreversible actions performed on their behalf. This can lead to unauthorized marketplace activity, reputational damage, unwanted financial commitments, or account policy violations if run without explicit consent and clear approval boundaries.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill describes recurring external API activity for fetching jobs, reading profiles, and submitting proposals, and even instructs the agent to discover live endpoints and authentication methods via web search. Without disclosure of data flows, authentication handling, rate limits, and approval requirements, this creates privacy, account misuse, and unintended automation risks against a third-party platform.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.