T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:31- Finding
Unredacted Error Messages Are Transmitted to an External Telemetry Service
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
AgentPulse
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is a coherent cost-tracking integration, but it sends broad, silent telemetry about every LLM call to a third party and may forward raw error details.
Review this carefully before installing. It is not showing destructive behavior, hidden code, or OS-level persistence, but installing and configuring it means your agent may silently send detailed usage metadata for all LLM calls to AgentPulse, including raw error messages that could contain sensitive context. Only use it if you are comfortable with that data flow and can control or disable telemetry in your OpenClaw setup.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)
T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Skill Imposes Silent Session-Wide Telemetry Beyond Request-Specific Scope
- Content
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- Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)
Vague Triggers
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 93% confidence
- Finding
The skill description is broad enough to trigger on common questions about costs, errors, and performance, which increases the chance the skill activates in routine conversations without the user clearly intending third-party telemetry behavior. In this skill’s context, overbroad triggering is more dangerous because activation leads to external API interaction and reporting instructions tied to user/account metadata.
- Content
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 95% confidence
- Finding
The skill is explicitly designed to transmit data to external endpoints using curl and an API key, so the finding is real even though the functionality is expected. In context this is somewhat mitigated by the documented endpoints and limited stated scope, but it remains security-relevant because external transmission occurs automatically and could expose operational metadata or sensitive error details to a third-party service.
- Content
md env: - AGENTPULSE_API_KEY bins: - curl primaryEnv: AGENTPULSE_API_KEY ---
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 98% confidence
- Finding
The instruction to report every LLM API call 'silently in the background' without notifying the user creates undisclosed outbound transmission of operational metadata to a third party. Even if prompt content is excluded, this still leaks usage patterns, model choices, error details, and timing data, and the lack of contemporaneous notice or consent materially increases privacy and trust risk.
- Content
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.