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Security audit

isp-api-tester

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an ISP API test runner, but it exposes and handles credentials, database data, tokens, and reports in ways users should review carefully before installing.

Install only in a controlled test environment after rotating the exposed credentials, requiring HTTPS, using least-privilege read-only database accounts, reviewing every config file's SQL and URL, and treating generated report files as sensitive secrets-bearing artifacts. Do not publish or share raw reports without redaction.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (6)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:66
Finding

Hardcoded ISP Credentials Exposed in Skill Documentation

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run_isp_test.py:59
Finding

Sensitive Authentication Material and API Data Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
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dict: headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json;charset=UTF-8"} try: if http_method.upper() == "GET": resp = requests.get(url, params=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout) else: resp = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout) ``` The supplied endpoint is explicitly plaintext: ```json "base_url": "http://opapi.test.51baiwang.com/router/rest" ``` ### Technical Analysis The default ISP endpoint uses HTTP rather than HTTPS. The token request sends the username, deterministic password derivative, and application secret in a JSON body without transport-layer encryption. The subsequent test requests may transmit an access token in the URL, a request signature, tax identifiers, invoice details, and other fixture or business data. Hashing the password does not replace TLS. A captured deterministic password derivative may itself be replayable by a party capable of repro ...[truncated 1303 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run_isp_test.py:229
Finding

Access Tokens and Request Signatures Persisted in Generated Reports

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run_isp_test.py:121
Finding

Arbitrary SQL from Configuration Executed with Database Account Privileges

Content
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Remediation
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T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
scripts/run_isp_test.py:617
Finding

Unsafe Dynamic Execution of a Mutable Adjacent Skill Module

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:187
Finding

Third-Party Dependencies Installed without Version or Integrity Pinning

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (10)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs execution of Python scripts that perform network access, database access, and generate local output files, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. In an agent setting, this creates an authorization gap: the agent may invoke sensitive capabilities without clear user-facing constraints, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests, credential use, or filesystem writes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed to use real database data, embedded credentials, external API testing, and local report generation, yet it provides no explicit warning or consent flow for handling secrets, production-like data, or writing artifacts containing sensitive responses. In context, this is especially risky because the document includes plaintext credentials and a database endpoint, so an agent could expose, misuse, or persist sensitive information during testing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation states the agent does not generate, copy, or rewrite scripts in the project directory, but later says it automatically generates report, result, and data files in the output directory, which may be the project directory. This contradiction can mislead users and downstream policy systems about actual write behavior, causing unsafe assumptions around local file modifications and data leakage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run_isp_test.py (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

python
'client_secret': appSecret,
    }
    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "*/*"}
    resp = requests.post(token_url, json=req_data, headers=headers, timeout=30).json()
    if resp.get('success'):
        return resp['response']['access_token']
    raise Exception("获取token失败: " + str(resp))

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Database fixture values are printed directly to stdout, which can expose real customer or production-like data in CI logs, terminal scrollback, or centralized log collectors. Because this skill explicitly loads '真实测试数据' from a database, the context makes the leak more dangerous than a generic debug print.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'url' from requests.post (line 548, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run_isp_test.py (reported line 280)May include surrounding context.

python
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json;charset=UTF-8"}
    try:
        if http_method.upper() == "GET":
            resp = requests.get(url, params=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        else:
            resp = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        try:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run_isp_test.py (reported line 282)May include surrounding context.

python
if http_method.upper() == "GET":
            resp = requests.get(url, params=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        else:
            resp = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        try:
            return {"status_code": resp.status_code, "body": resp.json(),
                    "raw": resp.text, "error": None}

Tainted flow: 'url' from requests.post (line 548, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run_isp_test.py (reported line 282)May include surrounding context.

python
if http_method.upper() == "GET":
            resp = requests.get(url, params=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        else:
            resp = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        try:
            return {"status_code": resp.status_code, "body": resp.json(),
                    "raw": resp.text, "error": None}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The generated JSON/JS/HTML reports persist full request bodies and response bodies to disk, which can include access tokens, identifiers, invoice data, or database-derived test fixtures. In this API-testing context, long-lived local artifacts substantially increase exposure through accidental sharing, backups, or later compromise of the workstation or CI environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The manifest description and visible documentation are entirely in Chinese, and the skill does not indicate that users may choose another language or that the locale restriction is required for a region-specific workflow. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.