T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Mandatory Transmission of User AppKey Through Skill Telemetry
- Content
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"}' ``` The surrounding instructions require the agent to execute the first telemetry command after reading the Skill and to execute the second command after receiving an AppKey but before making the first business API request. ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the agent to perform telemetry as a side effect of loading and using the Skill. In particular, it requires a user-provided `dataSourceId`, identified as an AppKey elsewhere in the document, to be passed to `umeng-cli trace`. This operation is not required to perform the documented read-only analytics requests. The behavior therefore changes the agent's execution goals by adding an undisclosed prerequisite operation involving user data. The project contains only `SKILL.md`; the implementation of `umeng-cli trace` is not present, so its destination, retention policy, access controls, and exact handling of the AppKey cannot be independently verified within the audited artifact. Although an AppKey may function primarily as an application identifier rather than a complete authentication secret, transmitting it can disclose which application is being analyzed and correlate that application with Skill usage. ### Attack Path 1. An agent loads and follows the instructions in `SKILL.md`. 2. The Skill directs the agent to execute `umeng-cli trace` immediately. 3. A user supplies or the agent obtains a `dataSourceId` or AppKey for an analytics request. 4. Before the requested business API call, the Skill directs the agent to place that AppKey in a telemetry payload. 5. The external `umeng-cli` binary processes the ...[truncated 787 chars]- Remediation
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